
2020
За пределами новой волны мифологизации Второй мировой войны
Essay competition in honor of the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II
Номинации и победители конкурса эссе
Обзор проекта
За пределами новой волны мифологизации Второй мировой войны
«Эссе» может быть как текстом, так и видео (в формате документального короткометражного фильма и т.д.). Рабочими языками проекта являются русский или английский.
Победители конкурса, отобранные по своим эссе, примут участие в двухнедельной учебной поездке по России (Санкт-Петербург, Ржев, Катынь и Смоленск), Беларуси (Минск и Брест), Польше (Варшава и Гданьск) и Германии (Берлин и Дрезден). Будут организованы посещения памятных мест, музеев и мемориалов, обсуждения с исследователями и активистами, а также самостоятельная и групповая работа с другими участниками. Учебная поездка запланирована на середину и вторую половину ноября 2020 года. В зависимости от обстоятельств (из-за пандемии Covid-19) эта дата может быть перенесена.
Заключительным этапом проекта станет конференция в Берлине, на которую будут приглашены авторы четырех лучших эссе, и где состоится церемония награждения. Конференция планировалась на вторую половину ноября, но, как и с поездкой, вопрос о датах остается открытым.
Все расходы, связанные с учебной поездкой и конференцией, будут покрыты организаторами.
В вашем эссе вы можете обратиться к обсуждению одной из тем ниже или предложить свою. Выбор страны(стран) для обсуждения в вашем эссе также гибкий, но обратите внимание, что акцент проекта сделан на опыте России, Беларуси, Польши и Германии.
• Вторая мировая война: «история» и «память» как объекты государственной политики и личного/коллективного опыта (взаимные молчания, противоречия, способы сосуществования и т.д.)
• Роль памяти о войне для внутренней и внешней политики в России, Беларуси, Польше и Германии
• Мемориальные законы: за и против
• Когда началась и закончилась Вторая мировая война: споры о периодизации
• Военные истории в медиа: опыт критического чтения
• Вторая мировая война в школе и школьных учебниках (история, литература, гражданское образование)
• Индивидуальная память и участие в публичных ритуалах военного поминовения: чему учит школа или не учит; военные парады, «Бессмертный полк» и т.д.?
• Местные традиции памяти о войне (дни освобождения городов и регионов; местные жертвы и герои, местные памятные места)
• Литературные образы: война, ее участники, герои и жертвы в прозе и поэзии
• Образы военных событий, жертв и героев в кино, театре и живописи (опыт критического взгляда)
• Современные арт-проекты как способ работы с опытом Второй мировой войны
• «Жертвы» и/или «герои», «освободители» и/или «оккупанты», «коллаборационисты» и/или «борцы с режимом»? Национальный опыт отражения Холокоста
• Как сделать рутину войны «видимой»: способы визуализации и нарратива
• Работа с «историческими документами»: как историки, документалисты и т.д. распознают и работают с доказательствами из прошлого.
Проект финансируется Федеральным министерством иностранных дел Германии.
По всем вопросам обращайтесь по адресу info@cisr-berlin.org.
Условия участия и темы эссе
«Эссе» может быть представлено как в текстовом формате, так и в формате видео (например, в виде документального короткометражного фильма и т. п.). Рабочими языками проекта являются русский и английский. Победители конкурса, отобранные за свои эссе, примут участие в двухнедельной учебной поездке по России (Санкт-Петербург, Ржев, Катынь и Смоленск), Беларуси (Минск и Брест), Польше (Варшава и Гданьск) и Германии (Берлин и Дрезден). В рамках поездки будут организованы посещения мест памяти, музеев и мемориалов, обсуждения с исследователями и активистами, самостоятельная и групповая работа с другими участниками. Учебная поездка запланирована на середину и вторую половину ноября 2020 года. В зависимости от обстоятельств (из-за пандемии COVID-19) даты могут быть перенесены. Финальным этапом проекта станет конференция в Берлине, на которую будут приглашены авторы четырёх лучших эссе и где состоится церемония награждения. Конференция была запланирована на вторую половину ноября, однако, как и в случае с поездкой, точные даты пока не определены. Все расходы, связанные с учебной поездкой и участием в конференции, покрываются организаторами. В эссе вы можете обратиться к обсуждению одной из тем, указанных ниже, или предложить собственную. Выбор страны (или стран), о которых пойдёт речь в эссе, остаётся за вами, однако обращаем внимание, что фокус проекта — на опыте России, Беларуси, Польши и Германии. Темы для эссе: - Вторая мировая война: «история» и «память» как объекты государственной политики и личного/коллективного опыта (взаимное замалчивание, противоречия, способы сосуществования и т. д.) - Роль памяти о войне во внутренней и внешней политике России, Беларуси, Польши и Германии - Законы о памяти: за и против - Когда началась и закончилась Вторая мировая война: споры о периодизации - Война в медиа: опыт критического прочтения - Вторая мировая война в школе и школьных учебниках (история, литература, гражданское воспитание) - Индивидуальная память и участие в публичных ритуалах памяти о войне: чему учит или не учит школа; военные парады, «бессмертный полк» и т. д. - Локальные традиции памяти о войне (дни освобождения городов и регионов; местные жертвы и герои, места памяти) - Литературные образы: война, её участники, герои и жертвы в прозе и поэзии - Образы военных событий, жертв и героев в кино, театре и живописи (опыт критического взгляда) - Современные арт-проекты как способ работы с опытом Второй мировой войны - «Жертвы» и/или «герои», «освободители» и/или «оккупанты», «коллаборационисты» и/или «борцы с режимом»? Национальные подходы к осмыслению Холокоста - Как сделать рутину войны «видимой»: способы визуализации и нарративизации - Работа с «историческими документами»: как историки, документалисты и др. распознают и используют свидетельства прошлого Проект финансируется Министерством иностранных дел Германии. По всем вопросам обращайтесь по адресу: info@cisr-berlin.org
Команда проекта

Севиль Хусейнова

Сергей Румянцев
Номинации и победители конкурса эссе
Timeline
February 27, 2023
November 2023
Study Visit in Portugal
April 2024
Study Visit in Brussels
April—August 2024
Development of the Urban Casebook
May 2024
Casebook and Final Project Meeting
Академическое эссе
Работы, демонстрирующие глубокое знание теоретических и общественных дискуссий о Второй мировой войне. Авторы этих эссе проявили самостоятельность в работе с материалом, а также умение живо и доступно представлять результаты своих исследований.
Дарья Чупрасова (Россия)
Бессмертный полк Великой Отечественной войны: постпамять и войны памяти

Дарья Чупрасова учится в магистратуре по специальности «Историческая социология» в Карловом университете (Прага).
"Мёртвые восстали рядом с живыми. Это не художественное преувеличение, это действительно произошло." – Сергей Шумаков Ещё до появления названия «Бессмертный полк» подобные акции проводились в нескольких городах СССР. Самое раннее известное событие такого рода состоялось в 1965 году: учащиеся новосибирской школы №121 прошли по улицам города с фотографиями ветеранов войны (Русальская 2014). В 1981 году в Ростовской области состоялось шествие матерей в чёрных одеяниях с портретами погибших сыновей (Ароян 2016). В постсоветские годы подобные мероприятия проходили как в России, так и в ряде других стран. Например, в Иерусалиме в 1999 году горожане вышли на улицы с портретами солдат в День Победы (Дёмин 2018). Организаторы проекта «Бессмертный полк» отметили, что со временем всё меньше ветеранов участвуют в уличных шествиях в честь Дня Победы, и решили возродить советскую традицию приносить к памятникам фотографии своих родных, немного модернизировав её. 9 мая 2012 года в Томске прошла колонна горожан с портретами своих родственников, участвовавших в войне — именно тогда и было создано движение «Бессмертный полк» в его современном виде. Традиционно в советских парадах участвовали ветераны и профессиональные военные. Это было первое шествие, в котором приняли участие обычные граждане. В акции приняли участие более 6 тысяч человек (О движении 2013). В следующем году, 9 мая 2013 года, акция прошла уже в 120 городах и сёлах России (а также в Украине, Казахстане, Израиле). В 2014 году — в 500 городах России и шести других странах (Ирландия присоединилась 2015). К 2020 году «Бессмертный полк» прошёл более чем в 80 странах и стал важной частью празднования Дня Победы, особенно с 2015 года, когда колонна впервые прошла по Красной площади вслед за Парадом Победы. Президент России принял участие в этом шествии с портретом своего отца, что вызвало обеспокоенность у организаторов, поскольку в Уставе акции указано, что она не является коммерческим, политическим, медийным или государственным мероприятием (Устав полка 2013). Несмотря на это, огромное количество участников «Бессмертного полка» стало поводом для заявлений о популярности нынешнего политического режима. Оппозиционные движения, не представленные в этой акции, часто трактуются как противостоящие лицу российского гражданского общества (Фёдор 2017). Популярность акции вдохновила появление других движений, например, «Бессмертные бараки», направленные на увековечивание памяти жертв политических репрессий. Это движение также собирает и хранит данные о жертвах репрессий: фотографии, биографические сведения, приговоры, информация о реабилитации (О проекте 2015). Из-за пандемии правительство РФ решило отменить шествия «Бессмертного полка» в мае 2020 года. Вместо этого акция прошла онлайн: любой мог загрузить фото родственника и информацию о нём на сайт. Всего поступило около 2,7 миллиона заявок (Слободян 2020). Из них был смонтирован видеоряд из портретов и историй, который транслировался почти две недели. В интервью проекту «Прошлое» организатор акции заявил, что если эпидемиологическая ситуация позволит, «Бессмертный полк 2020» всё же пройдёт осенью — вместе с Парадом Победы (Бессмертный полк онлайн 2020). В некоторых странах акция была отменена, в других, как в России, проведена онлайн — в Испании и Андорре (В Испании и Андорре 2020), Нидерландах, Италии. В Германии был выпущен фильм «Бессмертный полк — глобальное движение» на YouTube. В Брюсселе прошла онлайн-выставка «Женское лицо Победы» (Яковлева 2020). Постпамять и войны памяти. Марианна Хирш, впервые использовавшая термин «постпамять» в своей работе Поколение постпамяти (Hirsch 2012), анализирует жизнь детей, чьи родители стали жертвами Холокоста. Хирш утверждает, что чужая память может стать нашей. Травматичный XX век привёл к тому, что потомки переживших (или не переживших) Холокост, мировые войны, революции и гражданские конфликты стали воспринимать память предыдущего поколения как свою собственную. В этом случае память формируется не из личного опыта, а с помощью воображения. В книге Семейные рамки: фотография, нарратив и постпамять она пишет, что постпамять — это мощная форма памяти именно потому, что она связана не с воспоминаниями, а с «воображаемыми инвестициями и созданием» (Hirsch 1997: 20). Поэтому элементы постпамяти часто встречаются в искусстве и медиа — кино, литературе, живописи. В России исторически сложился отдельный популярный жанр — военно-историческое кино, чаще всего посвящённое Великой Отечественной войне (Ерохина 2017). Однако Хирш подчёркивает, что не считает постпамять достоверным источником для научных исследований или идей. По её мнению, постпамять — это механизм передачи опыта между поколениями, но важно избегать чрезмерной идентификации при принятии чужой памяти (Hirsch 2012). В российской практике памяти о Великой Отечественной войне характерно деление на два лагеря. Исследовательская группа «Мониторинг современного фольклора» в исследовании «Война за войну» делит интернет-аудиторию на два «воображаемых сообщества», объединённых языком, символами и политической позицией. Участники обоих сообществ считают себя потомками ветеранов, но одни идентифицируют себя с победителями, а другие — с жертвами войны (Война за войну 2016). «Пусть враги России помнят 9 мая!» — гласил лозунг одного из участников «Бессмертного полка» 2016 года в Санкт-Петербурге. Для многих эта память — не просто прошлое, а утверждение военного величия в настоящем. Популярный лозунг «Можем повторить» адресован тем, кто сомневается в репутации страны и её экономических потерях. Другие не принимают эту «победную» модель памяти, но они зачастую игнорируются политическим истеблишментом. В 2016 году экс-министр культуры РФ Владимир Мединский заявил, что страна достигла консенсуса по вопросам истории, и этот консенсус выражен в акции «Бессмертный полк»: «Великая Отечественная война и поколение победителей канонизированы обществом — это святыня, не подлежащая никакому обсуждению» (Без белых и красных 2016). Авторы исследования «Война за войну» также говорят о разрушающем эффекте столкновения двух сообществ — сторонников «можем повторить» и убеждённых, что «такого нельзя допустить снова». Это подрывает устойчивую традицию праздника (Война за войну 2016). Историк Алексей Миллер предлагает отказаться от антагонистической политики памяти, основанной на дихотомии «победитель-жертва», и использовать юбилеи как повод для свободного обсуждения уроков войны (Миллер 2020). Таким образом, акция «Бессмертный полк» стала поводом для переосмысления значения Победы, самого праздника и вопросов соотношения семейной и государственной, личной и коллективной памяти. Некоторые исследователи считают, что «Бессмертный полк» — это союз семейной и государственной памяти (Фёдор 2017). Самый яркий пример — участие Президента России в шествии в 2015 году с фотографией отца, как сына солдата, а не как главы государства (Путин возглавил 2015). В интервью проекту «Прошлое» основатель «Бессмертного полка» отметил, что в XX веке в истории России было три ключевые даты, когда утрачивалась семейная информация и реликвии (особенно фотографии): 1917, 1937 и 1941 годы. Это означает, что практически каждый гражданин России должен провести настоящее расследование, чтобы узнать о своих родственниках, найти их фото, данные, места захоронения (если они известны; многие солдаты до сих пор числятся пропавшими без вести), чтобы затем пройти с их фотографией в составе шествия «Бессмертного полка». Участники шествия, поднимая портреты своих родственников или надевая солдатскую форму времён войны, напрямую отождествляют себя с обобщённой исторической фигурой. Происходит своеобразная подмена: портрет становится «представителем» умершего на войне — не только для участника, но и для наблюдателей. Это самоидентификация, подтверждаемая внешним восприятием (Война как праздник 2017). Многим становится недостаточно просто помнить и говорить «мы помним», «мы гордимся». Возникает потребность наглядно продемонстрировать свою сопричастность — не просто прийти с фотографией, но и надеть военную форму, приклеить на машину наклейку «Трофей из Берлина» (чаще всего на немецкие авто) и т.д. Сама акция «Бессмертный полк» становится ритуалом в антропологическом смысле: возникает необходимость совершать определённые действия, чтобы выразить свою причастность к празднику. По данным опросов, День Победы и связанные с ним мероприятия перерождаются из дня скорби и траура в день национального единства (соотношение «радость» и «скорбь по миллионам погибших» — 3 к 1 у старшего поколения и 5 к 1 у молодёжи) (Левинсон 2015). Знаменитый советский поэт Роберт Рождественский однажды написал: «Это — не мёртвым, это — живым» (Рождественский 1970). Исходя из этой фразы, можно сказать, что участие людей в «Бессмертном полке» продиктовано стремлением продлить память, сделать личное частично коллективным и быть уверенным в том, что оно будет сохранено. Список литературы «Бессмертный полк» онлайн (2020) Прошлое. Радио. URL: https://music.yandex.ru/album/10254203 (дата обращения: 26.05.2020). Ароян И. (2016) Бессмертный полк. Впервые портреты фронтовиков пронесли на Дону в 1981-м // Аргументы и факты. URL: https://rostov.aif.ru/society/persona/bessmertnyy_... (дата обращения: 24.05.2020). Без «белых» и «красных» (2016) RG.RU. URL: https://rg.ru/2016/06/29/vladimir-medinskij-liuboe... (дата обращения: 26.05.2020). Дёмин В. (2018) По следу «Серого». Автобиографическая повесть. ЛитРес. Ерохина Т. (2017) Феномен памяти в массовой культуре: контрпамять и постпамять в отечественном кинематографе // Ярославский педагогический вестник. Фёдор Ю. (2017) Память, родство и мобилизация мёртвых: Российское государство и движение «Бессмертный полк». В: Фёдор Ю., Кангаспуро М., Лассила Ю., Журженко Т. (ред.) Война и память в России, Украине и Беларуси. Серия: Palgrave Macmillan Memory Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. Хирш М. (2012) Поколение постпамяти: Письмо и визуальная культура после Холокоста. — Издательство Колумбийского университета. Хирш М. (1997) Семейные рамки: фотография, нарратив и постпамять. — Гарвардское университетское издательство. Ирландия присоединится к всероссийской акции «Бессмертный полк» (2015) ТАСС. URL: https://tass.ru/obschestvo/1879814 (дата обращения: 24.05.2020). Левинсон А. (2015) Война как прошлое и будущее // Неприкосновенный запас. № 101(3). С. 89–92. Миллер А. (2020) Войны памяти вместо памяти о войне // Новая газета. URL: https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2020/05/05/85240-... (дата обращения: 26.05.2020). О движении (2013) Бессмертный полк. URL: https://www.moypolk.ru/letopis-polka (дата обращения: 24.05.2020). О проекте (2015) Бессмертный барак. URL: https://bessmertnybarak.ru/rubric/o_nas/ (дата обращения: 26.05.2020). Путин возглавил «Бессмертный полк» (2015) Dni.ru. URL: https://dni.ru/polit/2015/5/9/293191.html (дата обращения: 26.05.2020). Рождественский Р. (1970) Реквием. — М.: Художественная литература. Слободян Е. (2020) Как стать участником акции «Бессмертный полк онлайн»? // Аргументы и факты. URL: https://aif.ru/society/75_victory/kak_stat_uchastn... (дата обращения: 24.05.2020). Устав Полка (2013) Бессмертный полк. URL: https://www.moypolk.ru/ustav-polka (дата обращения: 24.05.2020). В Испании и Андорре пройдёт «Бессмертный полк онлайн» (2020) Известия. URL: https://iz.ru/1007175/video/v-ispanii-i-andorre-pr... (дата обращения: 24.05.2020). Война как праздник, праздник как война: перформативная коммеморация Дня Победы (2017) Антропологический форум. № 33. С. 84–122. Война за войну (2016) Уроки истории. URL: https://urokiistorii.ru/article/53357 (дата обращения: 26.05.2020). Яковлева И. (2020) Фестивали, конкурсы, флешмобы. Экспаты празднуют День Победы // TrendZEurope. URL: https://www.trendzeurope.com/den-pobedy/l179c3 (дата обращения: 24.05.2020). Фото: https://www.moypolk.ru/
Адам Возняк (Польша)
Вторая мировая война и биополитика в романах Юзефа Мацкевича
Юзеф Макиевич — писатель, получивший известность за пределами Польши в первую очередь как автор первой книги о Катынском расстреле. Он также написал множество романов, действие которых происходит в условиях, которые можно считать «нормальными» для Европы первой половины XX века. Эти романы вращаются вокруг военных событий, подготовок к ним или их непосредственных последствий. Его произведения трудно назвать шедеврами литературного искусства. Хотя они написаны грамотно с точки зрения языка, им недостаёт формального величия. Книгам Макиевича присуща репортёрская внимательность к деталям; эти детали становятся линзой, через которую можно рассмотреть ключевые политические явления XX века. Особенно интересны фрагменты, где писатель улавливает феномен, широко описанный теоретиками XX века, — вторжение политики в то, что древние греки называли oikos (дом, домашнее хозяйство) — противоположность politikos. Именно эти фрагменты кратко рассматриваются здесь. В своём анализе я сосредоточился на эпизодах, относящихся ко Второй мировой войне, и исследую теорию о антигероической природе самого крупного конфликта XX века. Для этого я опираюсь на современные исследования в области биополитики. Исследовательские вопросы, которые я хотел бы, пусть кратко, обозначить, таковы: почему жертва современной войны скорее напоминает безымянного лагерного мусульмана, чем Одиссея или Геракла, обладающих военной доблестью (areté) и индивидуальным достоинством (timé)? Как устроен механизм тоталитарного террора, что он не может (или не должен) быть увековечен в песнях, ритуалах или модных футболках? Как создаются эти антиперсонажи без биографии, сведённые к зоологической форме жизни? Как сообщество свободных людей превращается в «население» — ресурс, выраженный в расчётах потенциальной военной энергии? II Кажется, романы Макиевича дают хотя бы зачаточные ответы на эти вопросы. Они свидетельствуют о влиянии современной биополитики на ведение и понимание войны. Биополитику, в соответствии с выводами Мишеля Фуко, можно определить как отказ от модели, в которой биологическая жизнь (zoe) оставалась аполитичной и организованной в рамках oikos (домохозяйства). Кризис, сопровождающий разделение между zoe и bios (политическим бытием в polis), — один из самых обсуждаемых элементов современного мира. В рамках современной политики сама биологическая жизнь становится объектом политического контроля. Один из героев романа Nie trzeba głośno mówić («Об этом не следует говорить вслух») точно замечает, что «сегодняшняя политика — это составная часть частной жизни». В конце XIX — начале XX века биополитика проявлялась в росте евгенических движений, обществах по пропаганде гигиены, расистских дискурсах, контроле рождаемости и т. д. Некоторые из этих явлений можно оценивать как этически нейтральные или даже положительные. Однако в совокупности они подготовили почву для ведения войн и вовлечённости в политику в первой половине XX века. Эти дискурсы были направлены на превращение нации в коллективную ткань, за здоровьем и устойчивостью которой следит государство, включая «вредителей» (сексуальные и этнические меньшинства, генетические расстройства и пр.). Важно, что в греческой литературе «голая жизнь» (zoe) лишена индивидуальных черт. Это соответствует тенденции создания обезличенной массы, которая признаётся тоталитарными режимами XX века, и противоречит современному культу героев войны. Последние, поглощённые поп-культурой, часто заменяют собой святых. Их образы украшают стены зданий, становятся модными элементами одежды, иногда — даже татуировками на телах поклонников. Эти полумифические герои почитаются в духе рассуждений Ролана Барта о мифологии: создавая знаки (чести, гордости, мужества), мифология убирает реальные биографии или переписывает их в пользу идеологии. Всё это сопровождается хагиографией в самом творческом её проявлении. Хотя в этом нет ничего нового, первый выстрел войны, как правило, убивает истину. Однако всё это омрачено фундаментальной ошибкой, мешающей выполнить интеллектуальную задачу осмысления тяжёлого наследия прошлого века. Культ личности отвлекает внимание от того, что политика XX века была в значительной степени массовой «био-политикой» — то есть касалась не только bios (индивидуального, политического), но и zoe (голого, биологического, неразличимого). В этом контексте герои войны могли бы быть святыми, но — в свете концепции Homo sacer, предложенной Джорджо Агамбеном, — это те, кто исключён из политического сообщества: человеческое тело, которое можно убить, но нельзя принести в жертву. В Древнем Риме жертвоприношения имели религиозную природу, в то время как жертвы Второй мировой совершались на алтаре патриотизма. III Почему же романы Макиевича особенно пригодны для анализа этих явлений? Причин как минимум две. Во-первых, их действие разворачивается в военное время — период, когда биополитические усилия наиболее интенсивны. Во-вторых, они происходят в Виленском крае, Белоруссии или на землях, населённых русскими казаками — регионах, переживших и коммунизм, и фашизм, два режима, наиболее глубоко вторгшихся в сферу oikos. Практически в каждом романе Макиевича есть герой, которого можно считать Homo sacer, и события, иллюстрирующие противопоставление bios-zoe/oikos-politikos. Его военные истории начинаются с Первой мировой и советско-польской войны, в которой писатель участвовал как подросток-доброволец. Лешек, главный герой романа Karierowicz («Карьерист»), становится солдатом под давлением сложных социальных механизмов: не приказом, а под влиянием воспитателей, патриотической литературы и презрительных взглядов девушек, предпочитающих ветеранов трусам. Так герой оказался под давлением — как согласиться на то, чтобы твоя биография в условиях войны сложилась определённым образом. Всё это встроено в сеть танатологических и политических приказов, которые диктуют, когда нужно защищать жизнь, а когда жертвовать ею ради коллективной. Парафразируя Фуко, можно сказать, что Лешек одновременно приговаривается к определённому (военному) стилю жизни и допускается к определённому (военному) способу смерти. Как и в романе Lewa wolna («Лево свободно»), где герой добровольно идёт воевать с коммунистами, это пример того, что Кшиштоф Водичко назвал «культурой войны» — сетью значений, властей и приказов, организующей мышление о войне таким образом, чтобы она наделялась высокой ценностью жизни и смерти. Таким образом, мобилизация тела для войны — это уже не институциональное насилие, а привлекательный долг. Она может носить отпечаток жертвы ради родины, но при этом имеет высокую оценку. Всё это происходит в рамках классических политических решений. Однако история Лешека в армии поднимает важнейшие вопросы: взаимодействие военного управления с достижениями биомедицины. Больной герой попадает в полевой госпиталь и вовлекается в, возможно, самый важный союз XX века — между армией и медициной. Его тело становится собственностью государства. Побег из госпиталя трактуется как дезертирство. Вдобавок происходит распределение сексуальности: в случае лесбиянки-медсестры она блокируется, а Лешек по предписанию врача должен посетить бордель, чтобы «разогнать кровь». Polis присваивает его тело, делает здоровье делом общественным и рационализирует секс. Это современная политика Фуко в одном кадре. Современный Homo sacer — типичный герой Макиевича: индивидуум, вытесненный на обочину обществом, разрушенным войной; человек, которого нельзя принести в жертву во имя патриотизма, но можно убить. Лишённый лица и индивидуальности, сведённый к роли бактерии, угрожающей иммунной системе государства, он не годится ни для модной футболки, ни для памятника. Один из них — беглец из политической тюрьмы Генрик. Среди них — военнопленные, убитые в Катыни, евреи, гонимые по улицам Вильнюса, казачьи беженцы из Италии. Среди них — Павел из Droga donikąd («Дорога в никуда»), извозчик, представитель довоенной интеллигенции, ставший отщепенцем за то, что не украсил дом красным флагом на Первое мая. Он становится изгоем в собственном доме, зная, что любой осуждающий взгляд соседа может привести к доносу и смерти. Он бежит, запечатывая свою судьбу изгнанника, прихватывает с собой сложный oikos (жену и любовницу) и исчезает. Обстоятельства встречи с любовницей тоже можно считать актом сопротивления — в момент «политической свадьбы» СССР и Литвы Павел и Вероника покидают толпу и заботятся о своих индивидуальных телах. Пересечение границы oikos — сквозной мотив в сценах военных депортаций. Власть вторгается в дом буквально. Производство человеческой массы — сортировка, оценка, возможное уничтожение — как правило, предваряется разрушением oikos: отец (глава семьи) отделяется от остальных. Это истории казаков в Kontra и жителей литовских деревень из Droga donikąd. Разрушение политического сообщества завершает разрушение дома. Так рождается Homo sacer: его можно убить без последствий, но нельзя принести в жертву. Это первобытное насилие, возникающее из дисбаланса власти и безликих жертв, не похоже на гоббсовскую «войну всех против всех». Оно происходит внутри polis, но на телах, которые уже нельзя назвать bios, а лишь zoe. Были попытки избежать этого. Казаки в Kontra хотели написать собственную военную биографию, присоединившись к Гитлеру в борьбе с СССР. Но диктатор отвечает: «никаких азиатов!». Этот ответ запускает бактериологический дискурс, о котором писал Роберто Эспозито, — основу нацистского режима. Иммунная система армии должна быть защищена от чуждых тел. Именно здесь происходит слияние биологии и военного управления — непонятное офицерам старой школы. В Nie trzeba głośno mówić один из них говорит, что по всем военным канонам участие русских в войне против СССР было бы на пользу немецкой пропаганде. Но это участие скрывали от Гитлера и общественности. Политическая бактериология пронизывает и советские «чистки врагов народа», и нацистские «зачистки жизненного пространства». Более того, этот дискурс так проник в общественную ткань, что сам Макиевич легко использует его — говоря, например, о «большевистской чуме». Таким образом, и тема, и попытка литературного сопротивления имеют одни и те же корни, как это часто бывает. IV В «Вопросе о технике» Мартин Хайдеггер писал, что в XX веке природа стала ресурсом, из которого извлекается энергия и который направляется и контролируется. В романах Макиевича человеческие жизни рассматриваются аналогично. В Droga donikąd советских чиновников отчитывают за то, что они депортировали лишь 25% от запланированного населения; в Nie trzeba głośno mówić цитируется мнение д-ра Менде о необходимости «использовать азиатские народы» в войне с Россией. В описании подготовки к обороне Москвы упоминается мобилизация «40% всех живых сил, 35% всех танков…» и т. д. Это всё указывает на определённый взгляд на мир, политику, войну и саму человеческую жизнь. Он, вероятно, возник там, где сошлись разные процессы. Польский исследователь биополитики Пётр Мадейчик назвал их «медицинскими и садоводческими»: управление здоровьем коллективной ткани и выпалывание сорняков, удаление бактерий — на этом фундаменте развернулась значительная часть Второй мировой войны. В XX веке дискурс точных наук с его таблицами и процентами объединился с политикой и привёл к сдвигам, изменившим не только поле зрения властей, но и так называемый «типичный профиль жертвы» Второй мировой. Размышления над этим профилем ставят под сомнение правомерность, а то и этическую допустимость героического дискурса о самом масштабном конфликте в истории человечества. Осмысление Второй мировой не должно сводиться к пополнению местных пантеонов новыми героями. Массовость и анонимность жертв стираются не только из-за их количества — это результат сложных социотехнологических процессов. С их исчезновением мы, возможно, теряем возможность для подлинного размышления и, как следствие, шанс на то, что «никогда снова» не останется пустым лозунгом.
Клара Фридрихсен (Германия)
Забытое Едвабне. Забывание и воспоминание в польской коллективной памяти: резня в Едвабне как пример исследования

Сцена из фильма «Последствия» (2012)
Клара Фридрихсен в настоящее время заканчивает бакалавриат по программе «Интегрированные европейские исследования» в Университете Бремена (Германия). Во время учёбы в Бремене и Санкт-Петербурге у неё сформировался живой интерес к культурным, политическим и социальным движениям в Восточной Европе. У каждого из нас есть своё представление о личной памяти, сформированной на протяжении всей жизни. Однако память — это абстрактное понятие, которое не всегда поддаётся осмыслению. Психолог Йенс Брокмайер предложил теорию того, как работает коллективная память. То, что помнится, проявляется в формах коммеморации, годовщин, памятников и других общественных местах памяти; напротив, забвение не находит своего выражения. Тем не менее оно формирует память и оказывает важное, хотя и недооценённое, влияние на наше восприятие прошлого, настоящего и будущего. Воспоминаемое объединяет людей, формирует чувство коллективной памяти и культурной принадлежности, а также определяет их стремление к знанию полной истины. Однако память можно рассматривать как процесс, включающий две стороны — запоминание и забывание, которые совместно формируют опыт, мышление и воображение (см. Brockmeier 2002). По состоянию на 2020 год, массовое убийство в Едвабне считается хорошо изученным историческим событием. 10 июля 1941 года еврейские жители небольшого польского города Едвабне были убиты своими соседями — поляками. Их загнали в сарай и сожгли заживо. Как говорит профессор Шевах Вайс в документальном фильме «Два сарая»: «Это было массовое убийство во всех смыслах. Массы убивали и массы были убиты» (Haim 2014). Публикация книги Яна Т. Гросса Соседи: Уничтожение еврейской общины в Едвабне, Польша на польском языке в 2000 году впервые бросила вызов официальной историографии как на национальном, так и на международном уровне. Но что происходило в процессе формирования памяти? В польском каноне долгое время утверждалось, что за убийство ответственны немецкие нацисты, хотя, по разным свидетельствам, приведённым в книге Гросса, они напрямую не участвовали (см. Gross 2001). С тех пор эта тема приобрела популярность как среди польских, так и среди зарубежных историков. На протяжении 59 лет не велось никакого публичного обсуждения событий, и первая книга по этой теме на польском языке — «Соседи: история уничтожения еврейского местечка» — вышла лишь в 2000 году. Английский перевод, использованный в этом эссе, был опубликован в 2001 году. Еврейское население небольшого городка было уничтожено. Как такое стало возможным и что произошло за эти годы? Это эссе представляет собой хронологический обзор памяти о резне в Едвабне. Официальный нарратив формировался таким образом, чтобы представить Польшу и, в особенности, жителей Едвабне, невинными. Утверждалось, что убийство совершили нацисты. Тем не менее, об этом событии помнили местные жители и еврейские выжившие из этого региона, которым было трудно сохранить собственную память. Эта «истинная» память проливала свет на польский антисемитизм и участие поляков в преступлении, а потому не вписывалась в канон как послевоенной коммунистической эпохи, так и постсоветского времени. Она не могла быть частью официального и коллективного образа нации жертв, мучеников и героев. Всё изменилось в 2000 году, когда Ян Т. Гросс опубликовал свою книгу «Соседи» — национальная и международная дискуссия о «подлинных» событиях не только вызвала интерес к расследованию резни в Едвабне, но и поставила под сомнение самоощущение поляков, их участие в Холокосте и польско-еврейские отношения во время войны. Эта дискуссия дала пространство для памяти выживших и их родственников. Расследования массового убийства проводились сразу после окончания Второй мировой войны, но были тут же подавлены. Переписывание польского нарратива в коммунистическую эпоху было необходимо для формирования новой национальной идеи, но не оставляло места для критической культуры памяти, поскольку в центре стояли польские страдания. Официальный нарратив изображал поляков как жертв, мучеников и героев, побуждая гордиться своей нацией. В конце 1960-х годов партия партизан даже усилила антисемитские нарративы, представляя евреев как угрозу и Запад — как антипольскую силу, при этом уравнивая судьбы поляков и евреев. В 1963 году в Едвабне был установлен памятник с надписью: «Место мучений еврейского народа. Гестапо и нацистская полиция сожгли заживо 1600 евреев 10 июля 1941 года» (Wolentarska-Ochman 2006: 155). Солидарность, возникшая в 1980-х годах, стала первой попыткой критически осмыслить польско-еврейские отношения и создала условия для пересмотра коллективной памяти (см. Michlic 2002: 5). Политические изменения конца 1980-х годов породили отдельные обсуждения, но не изменили коллективное отношение в обществе в целом (см. Michlic 2012: 74). В 1988 году польская режиссёр Агнешка Арнольд взяла интервью у жителей Едвабне, в результате чего появились два документальных фильма о резне. В 1990-х годах историки начали обсуждение необходимости переосмысления «тёмного прошлого» Польши. Тем не менее публикация книги Яна Т. Гросса в 2000 году стала поворотным моментом в широкой дискуссии о коллективной памяти Холокоста и польско-еврейских отношениях на национальном и международном уровне. Михлик утверждает, что «политическая стабильность, допускающая публичное осмысление прошлого, а также принятие самокритики в рамках определённой коллективной культуры» являются необходимыми условиями для такой дискуссии (Michlic 2012: 67). С 2000 по 2002 годы дебаты, вызванные «Соседями», привели к обсуждению польского участия в преступлениях, военных польско-еврейских отношений и новому критическому взгляду на коллективную память. В сентябре 2000 года Институт национальной памяти (IPN) начал официальное расследование резни. На 59-ю годовщину трагедии в Едвабне прошла официальная церемония памяти с участием мэра и местных жителей. Как пишет Волентарска-Охман: «Летом 2000 года всё казалось идущим по верному пути» (Wolentarska-Ochman 2006: 158). К 2020 году продолжались споры о действительном ходе событий и их памяти. Чтобы понять, как формируется память нации и общества, необходимо обратиться к теории памяти. Около ста лет назад Морис Хальбвакс ввёл понятие «коллективной памяти» как памяти индивида, развивающейся в социальной среде, социально опосредованной и формирующейся посредством коммуникации. Каждый человек формирует своё восприятие прошлого в окружении, одновременно участвуя в формировании коллективной памяти этого окружения (см. Assmann & Czaplicka 1995: 126). Ян Ассманн дополнил эту концепцию идеей «культурной памяти», которая не привязана к повседневности, а связана с прошлым и передаётся через «культурные формы» — памятники, тексты, ритуалы — и «институциональную коммуникацию» — чтения, практики, обряды (Assmann & Czaplicka 1995: 129). Особенно важным в этом анализе является понятие «контр-памяти» — памяти, противостоящей коллективной. Память о резне в Едвабне можно рассматривать как контр-память в 2000 году, поскольку она бросала вызов основам коллективной памяти. Если опираться на объяснение психолога Йенса Брокмайера о том, как на мышление индивида влияет дискурсивная и культурная среда (см. Brockmeier 2002: 21), становится ясно, что в условиях репрессий советской эпохи индивидуальному сознанию было трудно сохранять определённые воспоминания. Каждый человек выбирает воспоминания по «когнитивной и эмоциональной значимости» (Brockmeier 2002: 22), то есть — по личной значимости. Можно утверждать, что убийство евреев — это именно такая память. Однако сознание индивида — лишь один элемент коллективной памяти, социальной памяти и коммеморации, которые также производят отбор. Отбирая одну информацию, общество исключает другую — и она забывается. Исключённая информация замещается новой логикой, создающей новую структуру. В случае коллективной польской памяти о Второй мировой войне и действиях поляков это структура памяти о жертвенности, героизме и мученичестве. В рамках этой структуры воспоминания о польских преступлениях не находят места. Хальбвакс объясняет, что каждый человек помнит и забывает в соответствии с личными культурными «рамками» (религия, политика и т.д.) (см. Halbwachs, по Brockmeier 2002: 23–24). По Хальбваксу, коллективная память формируется такими структурами, а элементы, не вписывающиеся в неё, — забываются. Брокмайер добавляет, что мировоззрение индивида всегда укоренено в социальных нормах, ценностях и «общей памяти совместно пережитого прошлого» (Brockmeier 2002: 18). Алейда Ассманн в своей теории «динамики культурной памяти» добавляет к причинам забвения «психологическое давление», утверждая, что «болезненные или противоречивые воспоминания скрываются, вытесняются, перезаписываются или стираются» (Assmann 2008: 97). По её мнению, существует две культурные формы забвения: активное и пассивное — преднамеренное и непреднамеренное. Материальные и нематериальные воспоминания могут быть намеренно удалены, переработаны или подвергнуты цензуре, а могут быть утеряны, забыты, оставлены или вытеснены из поля внимания, значимости и применения (см. Assmann 2008: 97–98). В случае с памятью о резне в Едвабне можно утверждать, что память о событиях была столь долго подвергаема цензуре, то есть «активно забыта», что в результате коллективная память непреднамеренно её отвергла — поскольку она вышла за пределы внимания, значимости и использования. После публикации «Соседей» эти забытые коллективные воспоминания внезапно вернулись в культурную память и получили возможность быть восстановленными. Резня в Едвабне и её коллективное забвение показывают, насколько тесно связаны память и забвение. Забвение не означает отсутствие памяти, а формирует то, как мы помним. Как утверждает Алейда Ассманн: «То, что забыто, не всегда навсегда утрачено. Оно может быть восстановлено» (Assmann 2008: 100). Таким образом, забвение не является ни противоположностью, ни противоположным полюсом памяти — оно лишь другое её проявление. На протяжении почти 60 лет память о Едвабне оставалась подавленной — активным и пассивным забвением. Она противоречила официальной версии прошлого, вызывала психологическое давление и не соответствовала культурным рамкам послевоенной Польши. В 2000 году память прорвалась в публичное пространство. Благодаря книге Яна Т. Гросса воспоминания выживших стали коллективной памятью и частью культуры памяти. Они нарушили господствующую структуру и восстановили то, что было забыто. Однако они также показали, насколько зыбким является процесс запоминания и как он зависит от внешних условий, политического климата и общественной готовности к осмыслению травматического прошлого. Память требует пространства, внимания и признания. Без них она рискует снова быть вытесненной. После первоначального всплеска интереса и обсуждения в начале 2000-х годов, тема Едвабне вновь стала вызывать сопротивление — как на уровне отдельных людей, так и на уровне государства. В 2016 году, в 75-ю годовщину трагедии, польские официальные лица не присутствовали на памятной церемонии. Президент Анджей Дуда не сделал публичного заявления, хотя в прошлом годах президенты (в том числе Александр Квасьневский) участвовали в коммеморации. Это свидетельствует о сохраняющемся напряжении и неоднозначности в вопросе памяти о резне в Едвабне. Коллективная память по-прежнему формируется в борьбе между признанием и вытеснением. Эссе показывает, что воспоминания не существуют сами по себе: они конструируются, репрезентируются, перерабатываются — и в этом процессе они могут быть как усилены, так и исключены. Чтобы критически осмыслить и сохранить память, необходимы усилия — институциональные, политические и личные. Память — это не просто акт воспоминания, но и акт ответственности. В случае Едвабне ответственность за память требует признания сложного прошлого, отказа от героизирующего нарратива и готовности к самокритике. Только так возможно построение инклюзивной и зрелой культуры памяти, способной не только помнить, но и учиться на ошибках прошлого. Фото https://www.wienerlibrary.co.uk/Blog?item=453&returnoffset=0 Список литературы Assmann, A. (2008). Канон и архив. В: Young, S. (ред.) Исследования культурной памяти: международный и междисциплинарный справочник, 8-е изд. Walter de Gruyter, Берлин, с. 97–107. Assmann, J. & Czaplicka, J. (1995). Коллективная память и культурная идентичность. New German Critique, (65), 125–133. Brockmeier, J. (2002). Помнить и забывать: нарратив как культурная память. Culture & Psychology, 8 (1), 15–43. Gross, J. T. (2001). Соседи: разрушение еврейской общины в Едвабне, Польша. Princeton University Press, Принстон. Haim, H. (2014). Два амбара, Израиль. Kapralski, S. (2017). Евреи и Холокост в ландшафтах памяти Польши: исследование трансcкультурной амнезии. В: Sindbæk Andersen, T. & Törnquist-Plewa, B. (ред.) XX век в европейской памяти: трансcкультурная медиaция и рецепция, 34-е изд. Brill, Лейден, Бостон, с. 170–197. Michlic, J. (2002). Примирение с «тёмным прошлым»: польская дискуссия о резне в Едвабне. Рабочая статья. Еврейский университет в Иерусалиме, Иерусалим. Michlic, J. (2012). Дебаты о Едвабне: переосмысление польской национальной мифологии. В: Wistrich, R. S. (ред.) Отрицание Холокоста: политика коварства. Walter de Gruyter, Берлин, Бостон, с. 67–84. Winiewski, M. & Bulska, D. (2020). Антисемитизм в Польше. https://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/antisemitismus/308451/antisemitismus-in-polen. Дата обращения: 14.09.2020. Wolentarska-Ochman, E. (2006). Коллективная память о Едвабне: неустойчивое воспоминание о Второй мировой войне в посткоммунистической Польше. History & Memory, 18 (1), 152–178.
Marcin Ogrodnik (Poland)
Poland's turn to history
Marcin Ogrodnik - a Student at Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology When communism was drawing to an end in Eastern Europe, Poland and the other countries in this part of the Old Continent faced a problem of disorderly historical heritage. After the time of an undemocratic rule in the Polish People's Republic following WWII (1939 -1945), 50 years of Polish history waited for critical revision and orderly narrative that could achieve a desirable status against the general European narratives of predominantly WWII. It comes as no surprise then that since day one of the III Republic of Poland (1989), the issues of history and memory have surfaced in political life and the social debate. Undoubtedly, Poland and its citizens had to face modernity and the processes typical of system changes referred to by Koselleck (2009); the country had to handle the burden of history getting lost in the modern time regime (Assmann 2013, 19). It has been 31 years since the system changes in 1989 and it would be desirable to say that the Polish society, the government, the intellectual elite etc. made an effort to revise the past jointly, objectively, by referring to documents and respecting the different stances of the various groups of the society. Lamentably, despite all the declarations and attempts made primarily by the subsequent ruling parties, the process has never been completed. Despite the relative consensus about the need of revising the times of the Polish People's Republic and WWII, motivated by the interest of the citizens looking for their identity in a modern society and the need to reinforce the country's internal and foreign politics, since the early days of the III Republic of Poland, history and remembrance have become a bone of contention between various political parties. For 31 years, disputes over history and remembrance, the way of conceiving them and their role in the political and intellectual lives have divided the Polish society. They have been accompanied by a desired vision of the historical process and the state's involvement in propagation thereof. The divide does not result from the various interpretations of historical events which by their very nature can divide communities; rather, it is an effect of turning history and remembrance into a tool of political fight which, in turn, halts the emergence of Polish historical that would take account of facts. In this essay I would like to analyse two approaches to history and remembrance prevailing in Poland. By 1989, the Polish political arena and society were divided into the defenders and critics of the achievements of the III Polish Republic (Machcewicz 2012: 172–176), into the successors of the tradition of the II Polish Republic (patriots) or liberals and traditionalists (terminology used in this article as existing in the Polish political debate). Drawing a line under the past The major assumptions of the liberal approach to history and remembrance were made back at the end of the Polish People's Republic, following the activity of a part of the democratic opposition, defined as the secular left wing by Adam Michnik (a Polish historian, journalist and propagator of a liberal approach to history and remembrance). An essay by Jan Józef Lipski from 1981, "Two motherlands, two patriotisms. On Poles' national megalomania and xenophobia", has been regarded a manifesto of the political group and its followers. The essay includes the author's warning that cultivation of false national myths and silence about the dark episodes in a nation's history is a source of contemporary and future evil. Lipski addressed Poles to be alert and to treat any new "patriotic" offensives with suspicion if it is an act of uncritical copying of the favourite slogans of the national megalomania (Lipski, 1992, pp. 139 -164). After 1989, a liberal approach to the past prevailed in the public debate and social life due to a need of restoring the country's economy and a specific power structure in the world of politics, media and culture. The need to "draw a line" (Mazowiecki, 1989) that would separate Poland from the communist past and WWII for the benefit of economic growth, stabilising Poland's relations with the neighbouring countries, coupled with a need to approaching the West by joining the European Union and NATO, has transformed into the country's official neutral attitude towards shaping Poles' historical awareness. Zdzisław Krasnodębski, a Polish sociologist and social philosopher, justified the situation by saying that A liberal and democratic state needs to remain neutral about history; otherwise, it would violate its own rules: freedom of conscience and a neutral world view. In a democratic country, the legislative and judicial authorities cannot decide about the official truth about the past (Krasnodębski, 2005). Undoubtedly, the liberal and democratic governments of 1989–2005 and 2007–2015 honoured their promises and assumptions about not getting involved in resolving historical disputes. By leaving to historians the moot points related to WWII (for example, the Polish-Jewish and Polish-Ukrainian relations), the governments united Poland with the EU members and encouraged a constructive debate with the neighbouring countries, especially Germany, Ukraine, Lithuania and, to a slight extent, with Russia. However, two can play that game: the act of the governmental institutions cutting themselves off from the past and banning it from internal and foreign politics has aggravated the Polish people's identity crisis which started with the system revolution. What is more, the crisis deepened when Poland accessed the European Union and led to a situation where Poles focused more on their identity, tried to find out who was to blame for the crimes in the past, the difference between facts and the historical narrative of other nations, for example Russia and Germany. Disappointment with the developments, the relative revision of communist Poland and completion of the economic and systemic changes led Poland to a crisis of history and remembrance. The situation ideally connects with Koselleck's analysis (2009). In his opinion, in the time regime of modernity, time keeps accelerating while the future becomes the present more and more quickly (Koselleck, 2009, p. 235). This, in turn, makes the future increasingly difficult to predict as it becomes a source of uncertainty rather than hope while the old crisis comes back. Perhaps the crisis should be overcome by looking for stabilizers rooted in the long history of humanity. Potentially, that this issue can be approached not only historically and politically but also theologically (Koselleck, 2009, p. 235). In Poland, the year of 2015 marked the beginning of the renaissance of history and remembrance based on traditionalists' assumptions and their offensive political history. A line drawn above the III Republic of Poland Since the very beginning, the attitude of liberal parties towards history and remembrance was criticised by conservative parties. The opponents were accused of indulgence in treating communist and war crimes as well as deforming Polish people's historical awareness which should have been reinforced, especially at the time of accessing the European Union. Among the numerous postulates put forward against the liberal governments, the need to separate any achievements in revising the past by politicians and the intellectual elite of the III Republic of Poland was very clearly emphasized. As a result, the conservative parties have strived to create the IV Republic of Poland, based on history and tradition. The discussion of the required new approach to history and remembrance intensified in 1996 when the Warsaw Club of Political Criticism started operation. Its members - intellectuals, social and political activists - discussed the relevance of consistent political history in Poland. Owing to their involvement in the political debate and the growing political popularity of the club's members (especially the founders and members of Law and Justice, a political party established in 2001), the concept was transferred to Polish politics but was also party-biased. Building up the image of Poland and the historical narrative based solely on the positive historical events has been the main assumption incorporating all aspects of the internal policy (education, culture, patriotic upbringing, national identity, attitude to national minorities) and the foreign policy (the form and range of promoting Poland in the world, the attitude towards the neighbouring countries and the historical legacy, reparations). Andrzej Nowak captured this idea very well in his text "Westerplatte or Jedwabne" (Nowak, 2001) in which he stated that a national community should not be based on remembering shame (the Jedwabne case[1]) but rather, on remembering moments which are testimony of cherishing the highest values (Westerplatte) (Łuczewski, 2016, p. 221). When in 2015, Law and Justice party enjoyed a large majority of votes in national elections, and their candidate was elected president of Poland, it was the beginning of domination of a conservative approach to historical issues, in accordance with the programme of political history. In the main political, media-related and self-government narrative, to the foreground came historical events and figures ( the "cursed soldiers") which are the reason for pride and, according to the ruling party, the basis for creating a new identity of Polish people. What is more, many books have been published and exhibitions organised with the intention of showing only glorious facts from the history of Poland[2] while any disturbing historical facts revealed by some historians, NGOs or artists touching upon poorly recognised aspects of specific historical events[3] have been heavily criticised and referred to as anti-Polish, liberal and, in extreme cases, communist. As a result of engaging history to achieve political goals, the government have used historical events and remembrance thereof to gain support for its decisions and as a means to seize power. An excellent case in point is a discussion of the ideological assumptions of the LGBT movement, accompanying the 2020 election campaign. In order to gain support among the elderly who prevail in the Polish society and who store in their individual and collective memories the events of WWII and communism, the LGBT ideology has been compared to Nazism and communism and accused of aiming to destroy the Polish, conservative and Christian identity. Political history vs. the truth Undoubtedly, both the liberal and conservative attitudes towards history and remembrance have many benefits and drawbacks alike. Cutting off from the past for the benefit of the present and economic development has led the Polish society to a crisis of national identity. This phenomenon has largely affected the country's internal and foreign policies and has put a stop to the development of civil society that could have played an important role in examining and propagating historical facts. On the other hand, projects financed by the government and aimed at surveying the specific events of 1939 – 1989, offered scientists and citizens autonomy in the research process while the results of the analyses were not subjected to censorship of state institutions. The slow changes taking place by means of a dialogue with conservative circles (e.g. the establishment of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) and settling up the time of communist Poland) have led to a slow yet effective process of explaining the mysteries of history and an emergence of documented, historical narrative based on the truth. The conservative approach to history and remembrance, prevailing in Poland since 2015, can be presented in a similar way. The actions instigated since 2001 by the conservative party have contributed to Poles' growing interest in history. What is more, the government's strong involvement in historical issues has resulted in establishing numerous memorial sites, publishing many books and organising remembrance days related to WWII and communist Poland. On the other hand, the act of owning historical remembrance, committed by the ruling party, definitely limits the process of establishing historical truths. When in January 2018, the Polish parliament enforced an amendment of the act of the IPN (ultimately repealed in June 2018) to introduce imprisonment for attributing the crimes of the III Reich to the Polish nation or the Polish state, it was clear that the steps taken by the government in the name of political history were not aimed at the truth or critical reflection about history. Any political narratives aiming at national minorities and other groups and a negative attitude towards the European Union state members show that the traditionalists are on a tract to building a clearly nationalist country. This also leads to curtailing freedom of carrying out scientific research aimed at discovering historical truth which includes also shameful acts of crimes committed by Polish citizens, e.g. on Ukrainians and Lithuanians. What next? As I have presented it here, since 1989 history and remembrance have been a subject of disagreement between two political fractions. The situation has also contributed to the division of the Polish society that has sustained until today. Attempts at healing it and taking the middle path in approaching the past (transition from political history to the culture of memory), made by the central parties, over time have not brought about the desired effect. What is more, a non-existent, active civic society has largely affected political history as we know it today, created by traditionalists. While Poland definitely needs to carry out a critical revision of the past, this will only be possible when history and remembrance are bereft of the party's involvement and when politicians use their capabilities to support historians and other researchers in the process of arriving at objective facts on the events of WWII and communist Poland. Both fractions, liberal and conservative, and their attitude to history and remembrance, have their benefits and drawbacks. However, finding a golden means would be a desired solution as it would allow to review the past, at the same time providing a sense of national identity, so important to the state's operations. The golden means would allow Poland to leave the vicious circle […] stop referring constantly to the Catholic faith, the crowned eagle and the barricades of the martial law (Tusk, 1991). As a result, aware of our mistakes and merits, as a nation we will be able to re-unite and stand in truth. As members of a global community, we will also be able to sit at a table with the other European and world countries, getting involved in a constructive debate on the shared historical burden in the form of WWII and communism. Bibliography: Assmann A. 2013. Ist die Zeit aus den Fugen? Aufstieg und Fall des Zeitregimes der Moderne, Carl Hanser Verlag. Koselleck R. 2009. Dzieje pojęć. Studia z semantyki i pragmatyki języka spo-łeczno-politycznego, translated by W. Kunicki, J. Merecki, Oficyna Naukowa. Krasnodębski Z. 2005. O genezie III Rzeczypospolitej raz jeszcze, Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej. Krasnodębski Z. 2008. Rozmowy istotne i nieistotne [in:] Pamięć jako przedmiot władzy, I. Sariusz-Skąpska (ed.), Warsaw. Lipski J. J. 1992 [1981]. Dwie ojczyzny, dwa patriotyzmy, [in:] Tunika Nessosa, PEN, pp. 139–164. Łuczewski M. 2016. Kontrrewolucyjne pojęcie „Polityka Historyczna" w Polsce, "Stan Rzeczy", no. 10, pp. 221 – 257. Mazowiecki T. 1989. Przeszłość odkreślamy grubą linią. Przemówienie Tadeusza Mazowieckiego w Sejmie, „Gazeta Wyborcza", no. 78, p. 3, 1989-08-25. Nowak A. 2001. Westerplatte czy Jedwabne, "Rzeczpospolita", 1.08. Tusk D. 1991. Partia ludzi wyzwolonych z popiwku, rozmowa z Donaldem] Tuskiem, urzędującym prezesem KLD, "Biuletyn Informacyjny KLD", no. 2. [1] In 1941, a Jewish community was murdered in Jedwabne by Nazis as well as Poles. [2] For example, "Wołyń", a film from 2016, directed by Wojciech Smarzowski. [3] A case in point is a drama by Tadeusz Słobodzianek "Nasza klasa", referring to the history of Jedwabne.
Asia Budagian and Vladislav Siyutkin (Russia)
World War II: "history" and "memory" as objects of public policy and personal/group experience (video essay)
Asia Budagian is a student of the School of Advanced Studies (SAS) at the Tyumen University and a researcher of communication and discourse practices. Vladislav Siyutkin, a sociologist, is a student of the School of Advanced Studies (SAS) at the Tyumen University. His research interests are protest movements and the transformation of higher education. Video essay in Russian https://youtu.be/ew9WrvxDF-s
Stephanie Schulz (Germany)
Den' Pobedy in Berlin: The 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. Understanding the Victory Day celebrations at Treptower Park War Memorial as an illustration of the conflicted European memory

Stephanie Schulz is currently studying in the bachelor program "Integrated European Studies" at the University of Bremen, Germany. Her focus of interest is the transformation of Post-Soviet states and the politics of memory. The Second World War has been part of the communicative memory of many Europeans, although it is now celebrating the 75th anniversary of its end. Adults and young people carry personal family memories and stories, in addition to state narratives and those taught in school. Inherited stories are the retold experiences of family members, or a direct transmission from grandparent to grandchild. Passed on are those personal stories of the last survivors of the Holocaust, war veterans and civilians, who survived and who are able and willing to share, despite trauma. But the great majority of the generation who experienced the war as children are nearing the end of their lives or already deceased, taking endless stories of the war to grave with them. Nevertheless, the Second World War is not to be forgotten within the European community, but the ways in which it is remembered— such as oral storytelling, or becomes cultural memory of a nation or a community, may vary.[1] Due to its brutality, war crimes and the monstrosity of organised mass murder of the European Jews, WWII haunts the European community into the 21st century. Moreover, it has reached a political scale of being an instrument of power in terms of framing and teaching history. In the year of the 75th anniversary of WWII, the survivors and eyewitnesses have nearly all deceased. But discussions, mystifications and competing narratives about the "authentic" historical truth continue and are regularly reignited, as the chosen example of this essay will show. On May 9th, 2020 thousands of people payed a visit to the Soviet War Memorial Treptower Park in Berlin, Germany.[2] Publicly known as the Victory Day, originally a Soviet holiday, they gathered to celebrate the end of WWII 75 years after the liberation of Europe from Nazism. For local Eastern Berliners the visits have been a regular event to observe in their district for many years. As will be explained, the event contrasts and supports multiple World War Two narratives. Firstly, the connection to the Eastern European, post-Soviet celebration and heroization of the Red Army. Secondly, the history of the city of Berlin itself, being part of the European Union and German memory politics sphere, which centers around the commemoration of victims and the centrality of the Holocaust and Auschwitz as the main place of remembrance (defined by Pierre Nora). I. The 2020 Victory Day Celebrations at Treptower Park War Memorial in Berlin The character of the event can be described as an intersection of a commemoration and a festival style celebration. Many people gathered without invitation, but rather by their own initiative. Consequently, the reasons behind their visits might vary, as well as their actions during the gathering. A common wreath-laying ceremony by high officials was followed by people lining up to the main memorial at Treptower park to lay flowers and take a picture in front of the memorial. The originally planned celebration could not be held due to COVID-19 pandemic event restrictions, hence there is no clear timeline of activities. Part of the celebratory character involved dressing up in military costumes, mostly Red Army uniforms. In addition, patriotic war songs were sung in Russian, signs and posters in favor of peace with Russia were held and the Soviet flag with hammer and sickle and the ribbon of Saint George were omnipresent.[3] Apart from the meeting at Treptower Park, there were also meetings in Berlin at the Soviet War Memorial in Tiergarten as well, also with some officials present. In May 2020, quarantine restrictions due to of COVID-19 meant that public meetings were generally forbidden. One of the exceptions was the Victory Day meetings at Treptower Park and Tiergarten Memorial. The annual meeting for Victory Day at Treptower Park has been supported by the Berlin Association of those persecuted by the Nazi regime - Association of Anti-Fascists (VVN-BdA)[4] since 2006. The reoccurring slogan is "He who does not celebrate has lost" („Wer nicht feiert, hat verloren"). The association was founded by a group of volunteers at the German-Russian Museum Berlin-Karlshorst (then called Museum of the Unconditional Surrender of Fascist Germany in the Great Patriotic War). Following a description on their website, the underlying message of the festival is "to send a clear signal that goes against historical revisionist tendencies and indiscriminate commemoration or the mixing of victims and perpetrators". The event was attended on the official site by most ambassadors of the former Soviet states.[5] Moreover, members of the German Orthodox Church and military officials have been present.[6] Moreover, German officials, like the mayor of Berlin, the prime minister of Saxony and members of left party the "Die Linke" party attended. Meanwhile, the group of private participants was not homogenous, and there were members of several social groups present: different unions, associations and cooperatives that mostly focus on a dialog with the Russian Federation like DKP, Berliner Friedenskoordination, Druschba were present. [7] Also, the association of the former GDR Army donated a wreath. In Interviews, German participants explained their attendance as a wish to celebrate and thank the Soviet soldiers for the liberation from Fascism in their country.[8] About 100 members of the Putin related biker club Nochnye Volki visited both memorials in past years— their way of honouring their heroes of the Red Army consisted of riding by motorcycle from Moscow to Berlin.[9] The Soviet War Memorial is located in the surrounding area of Treptower Park in the East Berlin district Treptow-Köpenick, close to Pushkin Allee. Many parts of East Berlin show the former influence of the Soviet Union, such as the Soviet memorial Schönholzer Heide and Soviet memorial Tiergarten. The Treptower Park memorial is the biggest in size, with about nine hectares, and is the biggest Soviet war memorial outside the post-Soviet states. Inaugurated on the 8th of may in 1949, it is not only a memorial in honour of the fallen soldiers, but also a military cemetery for about 7.000 soldiers who died in the Battle of Berlin. The central element of the park is the bronze statue "The Liberator", a sculpture of a Soviet soldier who breaks the swastika with his sword and carries a rescued German girl on his arm.[10] The memorial represents the Soviet memory of the Red Army as the liberator of Germany and Europe and the memory of the approximately 80,000 Soviet soldiers killed in the Battle of Berlin. II. Origins of the Victory Day celebrations The main monument at Treptower Park shows close resemblances to other Soviet war memorials that were build all over the Soviet Union in honour of the victory over Nazi Germany. Together with the famous Motherland Calls (1967) monument in Volgograd and the Magnitogorsk Rear-front Memorial (1979) they form a triptych. The continued building of many war memorials connected to the Second World War, in Russian referred to as the Great Patriotic War, has kept the memory alive. In the Russian Federation, the "well-established pattern"[11] of war-memory is well integrated into most social groups, from school children to veterans. The highlight is Victory Day on May 9th, which has been celebrated in the Soviet Union since 1945. While under Stalin and Khrushchev the date was not even a holiday for some years, the fascination with the war and excessive parades started in the Brezhnev period. Amir Weiner argues that World War II acted as a unification factor of the USSR citizens. It replaced the October Revolution mythos and created a new narrative and debatably even a founding myth for the USSR.[12] The Second World War is a part of the communicative and cultural memory of the post-Soviet space, and in the global historical community discussions about the number of victims are ongoing. Common sense is that the Soviet republics suffered immensely during the war (suffering about 27 Million deaths).[13] Hitler wanted to destroy the eastern European civilisation in order to "create living space" for Germans, and the war in the East was a war of extermination. Millions of civilians lost their lives and a collective cultural trauma can be attested.[14] Victory Day therefore functions as a day not only for celebration but also commemoration. On the one hand, the commemoration of the fallen soldiers and victims, and on the other hand the glorification of the Red Army. The "Heroes" are kept alive by the discourse in Russia— the established narrative being that they liberated not only Auschwitz, but also saved Europe, and especially Germany, from fascism. Other post-Soviet states like the Baltic states follow a different narrative approach of the war and the 9th of May, due to the conflicted memory of the Stalinist repressions. Still, in many former Soviet states it remains a public holiday.[15] At Treptower Park the Immortal Regiment was held, which leads to the understanding that there is a connection between the Russian civil society and the German one. The movement was originally launched in 2012 "by a group of liberal Tomsk TV journalists critical of what they saw as overly state-centred commemoration".[16] Its purpose is to highlight the personal connection between the veterans and their relatives and spark interest in family history. It is a way of honouring the heroic and tragic lives of the glorified Red Army by attending the Victory Day parade with a photo of a related soldier of the Red Army. An understanding of this phenomenon in the context of the 9th of May is the concept of postmemory by Marianne Hirsch (2012). Hirsch defines the generation of postmemory, that experienced World War II not through family or personal stories, but exclusively through the mediated versions such as TV and movies. The Immortal Regiment aims at exactly this generation, by creating a heroised understanding of their own family story. Mischa Gabowitsch describes it as a personalisation of the many individual family stories, through state but also civic initiative.[17] The originally decentralised movement is now supported by state. Critically looking at the tradition, the sentimental use of photos of lost grandfathers might lead to a hesitation to condemn war crimes of the Red Army. Looking at it critically as a "whitewashing" process, it can be compared to the German mythos of Weiße Wehrmacht. This is the myth that the Wehrmacht was only following orders with a pure and moral nature, and was not a part of any criminal activity or war crimes. III. Victory Celebrations in Germany The described aspects of Russian and post-Soviet memory politics lead to the question of how the city of Berlin— as one of the host cities of the 9th of May traditions— fits into the narrative. Understanding the celebration as a Soviet memory remnant may seem irritating, or from the opposite perspective, very logical. The city of Berlin is one of the main places of European history in the 20th Century. The city and its citizens carry countless places of remembrance in connection to the beginning and end of the war, being the capital of the National Socialist Party from 1933. The Red Army started to gain control in the Battle of Berlin from the 16th of April. After Stunde Null, the defeat on the 8th/ 9th of May, Berlin was divided between the USSR and the Allies. Being part of the GDR, East Berlin has had a different approach to political and historical education because of its ties to the USSR. In some way, the celebrations and narratives have already been a part of life in the former GDR, as the citizens experienced parades similar to those happening in Russia nowadays. Regardless of the final Battle in Berlin, the memory of the end of World War II is not present in a reoccurring celebration, as for example the 9th of May. In many other European states the 8th of May is a holiday, and in the GDR it was a public holiday between 1950 - 1967 and 1985.[18] The main pillars of legitimacy and common ground for the GDR were aligned with the memory polices of the Soviet Union. The GDR was founded after the liberation from fascism by the Red Army, and a deep connection and gratitude towards the USSR was therefore implied already in the basis of the state. East and West Germany were already at this point going in different directions in terms of memory politics, as the GDR celebrated the day of liberation, the 8th of May. The Western Germans did not celebrate any event in regard to the end of Naziism, as it was considered a defeat. The conservative parties stated "why celebrate a defeat?". [19] A historical reappraisal (Aufarbeitung) of the Second World War followed only decades later. In 2020, the city of Berlin has established a one-time holiday for all Berliners on the 8th of May, in memory of the end of World War II in 1945. An initiative by the Auschwitz survivor Esther Bejerano[20] asked for the 8th of May to be a permeant holiday in the German calendar. She argues in a letter to President Steinmeier and Chancellor Merkel that the day of liberation from the Nazi regime should be celebrated as such. Political left parties supported her argument for the creation of a new, permanent holiday, as they claim it is the day that made the democratic German Republic possible and through its celebration will remind Germans not to relativize the crimes. Another side of the coin is that Berlin, as the capital of Germany, is part of the Western German cultural memory which doesn't include a heretic celebration regard to WW2. As already depicted, the German term Vergangenheitsbewältigung (Dealing with the Past) was only coined after experiences of national trauma and collective mechanism of forgetting in the post-war years. The parents-children discussions and the ground-breaking speech of President Richard von Weizsäcker in 1985 were turning points in the discussion of the Second World War and Nazi crimes. For German society, the question of guilt is a constant matter of discussion. The political awareness for the topic is there, and German politics strive towards a constant reestablishment of the responsibility. Close relationships with Israel are one way of showing that, and school history classes are packed with information about the 1930s and 1940s and most of all the Holocaust. The "heavy, historical burden of guilt and Germany's responsibility does not expire", as Steinmeier said in Yad Vashem this year.[21] Celebrations in this context seem quite odd from the described German perspective. Rather than celebrating the liberation of the totalitarian state, the guilt and trauma of the remembrance of the war mark the memory. IV. Conclusion "Historical perceptions are nothing trivial; when they collide, they can have unexpected consequences."[22] This statement by Aleida Assmann expresses that memory politics have a power to them, which should not be underestimated. WW2 was experienced by all of Europe. Yet celebrations like the Victory Day in Berlin seem to be displaced in one city of the war, and fitting in another city. The event itself— the remembrance of the Second World War and the wish for a peaceful future, is what unites all of Europe, including the presented national memory politics of Russia and Germany. Yet the example of Berlin on May 9th shows a conflicted, yet uniting presentation of these understandings. Generalizing, the post-Soviet states use the heroization of the veterans as a positive founding myth, while the European Union centres memory around the negative founding myth of the Holocaust.[23] Fixed days of memory are an excellent example of this theory: on the one side the Victory Day on the 9th of May and, on the other side, the Holocaust Remembrance Day on 27th of January. A European parliament resolution put the Holocaust in the centre of European cultural memory, a common commemoration date for all of Europe.[24] The liberation of Auschwitz is a central role in both memory political spheres, but the approach of identifying the historical truth is different. One side focuses on the freed victims and another on the liberators. Another example of clash of memories are the controversies surrounding the Fifth World Holocaust Forum 2020. Several members (excluding Polish President Andrzej Duda, who was denied to give a speech and therefore didn't attend the meeting[25]) of the meeting gave political and historical speeches from their national perspective. German President Steinmeier focused on the crimes of humanity of his country's citizens and the guilt towards the Jewish population. President Putin's speech was also directed towards the victims of the Holocaust, yet more openly, he pointed at the losses of the Red Army.[26] One of the most common misunderstandings of memory politics is the simple, yet ground-breaking debate about historical dates. For instance, in Germany the 8th of May is the official end of the Second World War, while for the post-Soviet sphere the time of the final signature of the surrender of the Wehrmacht, the night May 9th, is celebrated as Victory Day.[27] Historical revisionism, history politics, historical laws, and memory politics present images, narratives and myths and are used as tools for creating identity and legitimacy. The celebration at Treptower Park War Memorial in Berlin 2020 shows commemoration and celebration of the end of the WWII, therefore it is an excellent example of diverging attempts at keeping the memory of the war alive. There seems to be a disconnection between the European countries of not only how to understand the ending of the WWII, but, moreover, in the understanding of who is responsible for it, and whether it should be celebrated or commemorated. The two sides of the coin are presented by the negative and positive myth of the end of the Second World War. But, nevertheless, the relevance of WWII is proven. The experience of World War II has the potential to be a unifying argument for all of Europe, against all odds, as postmemory generations have the possibly to recreate it. [1] based on Aleida Assmann und Jan Assmann theory. Das Gestern im Heute. 1994. Medien und soziales Gedächtnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-09784-6_7 [2] RBB fernsehen. Tag des Sieges. 10.05.2020. https://www.rbb-online.de/doku/s-t/tag-des-sieges.html (Last Access 13.09.2020) [3] Bernd Adam. Tag des Sieges 2020 Berlin, Ehrenmal im Treptower. 09.05.2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JS7rxvK8kQ8. Last Access (20.08.2020); Mathias Tretschog - Freier Journalist. Tag des Sieges, Berlin Treptower Park. 09.05.2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f8p9xWIvTMU. Last Access (20.08.2020) [4] VVN-BdA. Über uns. 14.04.2016. https://neuntermai.vvn-bda.de/. (Last access 15.09.2020) [5] Botschaft der Russischen Föderation. Gedenkzeremonie mit Kranzniederlegung am sowjetischen Ehrenmal im Treptower Park vom 9. Mai. 09.05.2020. https://russische-botschaft.ru/de/2020/05/09/gedenkzeremonie-mit-kranzniederlegung-am-sowjetischen-ehrenmal-im-treptower-park-vom-9-mai/. (Last access 05.09.2020) [6] RBB 24. Gedenken am Sowjetischen Ehrenmal trotz Coronakrise. 09.05.2020. https://www.rbb24.de/panorama/thema/2020/coronavirus/beitraege_neu/2020/05/berlin-corona-virus-treptower-park-ehrenmal-sowjetunion-weltkrie.html (Last access 09.05.2020) [7] Deutschen Kommunistischen Partei (https://dkp.de/); FRIKO (http://www.frikoberlin.de/); Druschba https://druschba-global.org/ [8] B Bernd Adam. Tag des Sieges 2020 Berlin, Ehrenmal im Treptower. 09.05.2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JS7rxvK8kQ8. Last Access (20.08.2020); Mathias Tretschog - Freier Journalist. Tag des Sieges, Berlin Treptower Park. 09.05.2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f8p9xWIvTMU. Last Access (20.08.2020) [9] Tomas Kittan. Nachtwölfe entern Befreiungs-Gedenken. 09.05.2020. https://www.bz-berlin.de/berlin/treptow-koepenick/nachtwoelfe-entern-befreiungs-gedenken (Last Access 20.08.2020) [10] Botschaft der Russischen Föderation. Gedenkzeremonie mit Kranzniederlegung am sowjetischen Ehrenmal im Treptower Park vom 9. Mai. 09.05.2020. https://russische-botschaft.ru/de/2020/05/09/gedenkzeremonie-mit-kranzniederlegung-am-sowjetischen-ehrenmal-im-treptower-park-vom-9-mai/. (Last access 05.09.2020) [11] Mischa Gabowitsch. ZOIS Berlin. The present and future of post-Soviet war commemoration. 08.05.2019. https://en.zois-berlin.de/publications/zois-spotlight-2019/the-present-and-future-of-post-soviet-war-commemoration/. (Last access 12.09.2020) [12] Amir Weiner. Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution. 2001. www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7t28v [13] John Silk. Deutsche Welle. Russia accuses US of downplaying Soviet role in WWII. 10.05.2020. https://www.dw.com/en/russia-accuses-us-of-downplaying-soviet-role-in-wwii/a-53386866 (Last access 12.09.2020) [14] Jeffrey Alexander,. Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity. 2004. www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1pp9nb. pp. 1-30 [15] Mischa Gabowitsch. ZOIS Berlin. The present and future of post-Soviet war commemoration. 08.05.2019. https://en.zois-berlin.de/publications/zois-spotlight-2019/the-present-and-future-of-post-soviet-war-commemoration/. (Last access 12.09.2020) [16] Direct quote. Mischa Gabowitsch. ZOIS Berlin. The present and future of post-Soviet war commemoration. 08.05.2019. https://en.zois-berlin.de/publications/zois-spotlight-2019/the-present-and-future-of-post-soviet-war-commemoration/. (Last access 12.09.2020) [17] Mischa Gabowitsch. ZOIS Berlin. The present and future of post-Soviet war commemoration. 08.05.2019. https://en.zois-berlin.de/publications/zois-spotlight-2019/the-present-and-future-of-post-soviet-war-commemoration/. (Last access 12.09.2020) [18] Nils Michaelis. Berlin erinnert mit Feiertag an Kriegsende. 06.02.2020 https://abendblatt-berlin.de/2020/02/06/berlin-erinnert-mit-feiertag-an-kriegsende/. (Last access 14.09.2020) [19] Peter Hurrelbrink. Befreiung als Prozess. Die kollektiv-offizielle Erinnerung an den 8. Mai 1945 in der Bundesrepublik, der DDR und im vereinten Deutschland. 2006. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90269-2_3. S. 83 ff. [20] Esther Bejarano. Auschwitz-Überlebende wünscht sich 8. Mai als Feiertag. 27.01.2020. https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2020-01/esther-bejarano-feiertag-nierderschlagung-ns-regime-auschwitz-komitee. (Last access 14.09.2020) [21] Bundepräsident Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Fifth World Holocaust Forum at Yad Vashem. 23.01.2020. https://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/EN/Frank-Walter-Steinmeier/Reden/2020/01/200123-World-Holocaust-Forum-Yad-Vashem.html (Last access 14.09.2020) [22] Aleida Assmann. Der Europäische Traum. 2018. https://www.kas.de/documents/258927/4633940/19_Assmann.pdf/ee656a83-e0ae-d068-0295-76c3d7fa332a S.19 ff [23] Birgit Schwelling. Krieg und Gedächtnis. 2006. www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/reb-8037. [24] European Parliament. European Parliament resolution on remembrance of the Holocaust, anti-semitism and racism. 2005. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2005-0018&language=EN. (last access 20.08.2020) [25] Alexandra Föderl-Schmid und Florian Hassel. Eklat um Auschwitz-Gedenken. Süddeutsche Zeitung. 08.01.2020. https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/polen-eklat-um-auschwitz-gedenken-1.4748890 (Last access 10.09.2020) [26] Евгений Баранов. Владимир Путин выступил в Израиле на всемирном форуме памяти жертв Холокоста. 1tv.ru. 26.01.2020. https://www.1tv.ru/news/2020-01-26/379453-vladimir_putin_vystupil_v_izraile_na_vsemirnom_forume_pamyati_zhertv_holokosta. (Last access 10.09.2020) [27] Direct Quote: Augsburger Allgemeine. Tag der Befreiung: Wo ist der 8. Mai 2020 heute ein Feiertag?. 08.05.2020. https://www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/panorama/Tag-der-Befreiung-Wo-ist-der-8-Mai-2020-heute-ein-Feiertag-id57331676.html (Last access 14.09.2020)
Kolensnikova Anastasia (Russia)
The Electronic resource "Memory of the people" as a source
to study the politics of memory
Kolensnikova Anastasia (Russia)
The Electronic resource "Memory of the people" as a source
to study the politics of memory
Bogdan Shnyp (Belarus)
World War II in school and school textbooks
Академическое эссе
These essays demonstrate a critical approach to family history and their personal experience of participating in the collective practices and rituals of the Second World War Commemoration
Xenia Lange (Germany)
On commemorative culture after 1945 – a German Gothic Story.
Xenia Lange studied Philosophy, Media Science and Psychology in Berlin and Vienna. She is currently in training as a psychotherapist and works as a psychologist in a sheltered workshop.
The tale "The Sandman" by E.T.A. Hoffmann tells the story of Nathanael, who suffers from childhood memories of dark experiences, and unsolved family secrets, that dispose him to despair and madness. A key role in those memories is played by his father's secret alchemistic experiments, conducted with a mysterious stranger during the night, which lead to the father's death at the end. Nathanael is not supposed to know anything about those nightly activities and is sent to the bed by his mother with the words: "Now go to bed, children! The Sandman is coming, I can feel it!" When asking the mother who this Sandman is, she denies his existence. Only the nanny tells Nathanael: "He is an evil man, who comes for the children that don't want to go to bed and who throws sand into their eyes till the eyes bleed and fall out. He takes the eyes and feeds them during half-moon to his children who are sitting in a nest and eating the eyes with their crooked peckers that are formed like the peckers of an owl." Nathanael starts to associate the unknown man who comes to his family`s house during the night with the Sandman. One night while hiding in his father´s room, Nathanael is detected by the unknown man who actually seems to be as dangerous as the Sandman from the nanny´s story. He punishes the child for his curiosity, shouting: "Give me the eyes, give me the eyes!" while trying to burn Nathanael´s eyes with the glow of a fire. Nathanael´s father rescues him, but the nightly event remains a silenced family secret and is surrounded by an aura of a social ban. Because Nathanael´s family threatens him with the Sandman and on the other hand denies the existence of this man, he is highly disoriented about what is real and what is not. The recurring narrative of the eye, and the prohibition of looking at reality, plays a central role in the novel. It can also be interpreted as the danger of disobedience against the commandment for concealment in a family that wants to hide a secret. As an ambiguous story about suppression and social prohibition of thinking and speaking openly, it serves as a analogy - for the memory in German families after 1945. The father´s dark involvement with the Sandman is silenced in Nathanael´s family, and so is the involvement of the ancestors of German families in the Nazi era. This essay deals with the large gap between the official commemorative culture concerning the time of National Socialism and the private engagement and entanglement with Nazi ideology of German families. I assert that there is a contradiction between the current German self-image of a nation that has worked through its own history successfully and the actual psychological reprocessing and integration of this time. It is true; that the outrages of those times are officially labelled as unprecedented crimes against humanity and as a fraction of civilization ("Zivilisationsbruch"), and Germany is often regarded as a model of commemorative culture. But it is overlooked, that most of German families don´t seem to identify themselves as perpetrators or beneficiaries of Nazi Germany. Rather, it seems as if an amalgam of self-pity, self-identification as a victim and a conspiracy of silence is established in families. When the American historian Saul K. Padover travelled through Germany in 1944 as a secret Officer to investigate the psychosocial consciousness of the Germans, he met self-absorbed people who considered themselves as Hitler´s victims, but not as part of a nation guilty of incomprehensible crimes. Because all his interview partners presented themselves as victims, he came to the ironical conclusion, that Hitler must have been "a really great man": "We have been here for two months [in Germany], we have conducted a lot of interviews and we haven´t met one Nazi yet. All the people are against Hitler. They have always been against him. What are the consequences? It means that Hitler must have done everything on his own, without the support of anyone. He started the war on his own, he conquered Europe and big parts of Russia on his own, he killed five million Jews, he starved six to eight million polish and Russian people to death, built 400 concentration camps, organised the biggest army in Europe and let all the trains arrive on time. Someone who can achieve this on his own must be quite good." I do not deny that there has been a shift since 1945 in the juridical and historical engagement with the Nazi era, as well as in the political and medial discourse and the educational policy. Monuments, historical sites and commemoration days were established, as well as textbooks, educational programs and research projects. After the war and unification of the GDR and BRD, a new German self-concept developed, which is framed as a democratic state that respects human rights and regards its own commemorative culture as a guarantee and proof for historical responsibility and betterment. In a strange twist Germany`s own inglorious past becomes fundamental to a new nationalistic overconfidence, which claims that the Germans are the world champions of commemoration. But the required self-image as a fully bettered nation is put into question by the continuity of nationalistic and racist tendencies, like the restricted immigration laws, the rise of the AfD, terroristic attacks by right wing extremists, antidemocratic and racist structures in the police and army and the reproduction and normalisation of right-wing ideology by politicians of the so-called moderate parties. It remains unnoticed in the official mainstream discourse, how it is possible that so much knowledge can be circulating regarding the Holocuast and the 2nd World War, while fewer and fewer descendants of the perpetrator-generation identify this knowledge as part of their family´s past. In a survey by the foundation "Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft" in 2019, a majority of the German interview partners said, that memory regarding the victims of the National Socialism is very important. But only 23,1 % regarded their ancestors as perpetrators of the regime and 67,9 % denied any entanglements of their ancestors with the Nazi regime. 59,6 % thought that their family members were the victims of the Nazis and 32,2% assumed that their parents or (great-)great parents had helped the victims of National Socialism. Actually, historians estimate that the real percentage of those who were in the resistance or who helped the victims of the regime lies at 0,2 %. If you look at all this data you may feel just like Padover during his investigations: Hitler must have done a lot of work on his own or at least with the marginal help from a German minority, while fighting against a lot of brave members of the resistance. That the data do not reflect the reality can easily be seen by looking at the results of the election in 1933, the enthusiasm for the war or the continuously rising number of party members in the NSDAP, which reached 8.5 million people in 1945. What and why is something remembered in German families, and in which ways? Furthermore, what are the consequences for the appraisal of victims and the self-image of the families? I was offered a glimpse into private ways of commemoration through my work as a psychologist in a geriatric ward of a hospital, where I worked with patients who were well advanced in their years, and who had experienced the time of the National Socialism. I realised that for almost all of the patients, the years in question had been a very formative time. While discussing this, I recognised a pattern in the narratives of the patients that almost always began with the end of the war and the post-war period, while completely decontextualizing from the reasons, why the war took place. It was a one-sided narrative of victimhood and a masking of their own responsibility for the war and the role of the perpetrator they had before losing the war. This became very obvious to me when they turned their narrative towards the brutality and cruelty of the Soviet army while keeping quiet about the atrocities of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Europe. The things they mentioned were as important as all the things they didn´t mention: the reason why the Soviet army and the other "Siegermächte" had to come to Germany, and that a large part of the German population had supported the war, especially the war in Eastern Europe, as long as they thought that they would win. I think the reason these blind spots in the narrative became so obvious to me is due to my background as the child of a Russian mother and a Russian-German (Russlanddeutscher) father. I also know the other side of the narrative, the devastations of the war in Eastern Europe, and the aim of the war to decimate the Eastern population, to erase the Jewish population, to conquer a new land for a nation without ("ein Volk ohne Land") and to enslave the Slavic subhuman being ("slavischer Untermensch"). The negative description of the soviet army was eye-catching because I couldn´t get rid of the feeling, that the patients were projecting the aggressions that the German population had felt against the Slavic population on "the brutal Russians". I also felt that the stories were not only about what had happened to them as individuals, but what "the Germans" as a collective had to suffer. While official discourse proclaims a responsible engagement with the past, the personal commemoration is characterized by a self-absorbed view and a complete lack of empathy for those who had been eliminated from the "Volksgemeinschaft" during the Nazi time. There is an eminent political aspect regarding the concept of trauma that can be used for an ideology of victimhood: not only the concept of trauma is widespread, but also the idea that a whole collective or society can be traumatised, especially through political persecution. By putting oneself into the role of the victim, one asks for compassion and the focus is put on one owns suffering and not on his/her misdoings. It also makes it possible to demand compensation for one´s suffering and to excuse further aggressions that one may develop in response to the suffering. By using the concept of collective traumatisation, the old but now forbidden self-identification as a "Volksgemeinschaft" can be re-established, compassion with this "Volksgemeinschaft" can be reclaimed and the initial aggression can be justified in a reversal of perpetrator-victim-roles. A growing number of publications show that my observations made in the hospital are not singular, but rather based on a general and recurring pattern. Those publications put the proclaimed integration of history into question. Instead, they show inclination to the victim-based narrative of the Germans and a victim-identified memory, a projection of the role of the perpetrator onto a few persons, the "flight" into over-identification with the victims of the Holocaust, a spread and transmission of falsified and embellished family stories about the supposedly resistant behaviour of grandparents and great-grandparents, as well as a duty for loyalty felt in German families that produces silence. In the interview study "Grandpa wasn´t a Nazi" ("Opa war kein Nazi. Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im Familiengedächtnis") by Welzer, Moller and Tschuggnall, they examine the transmission of historical awareness and remembrance in German families. They investigated the way in which the memory of the Nazi era is passed through generations within German families, and arrived by the conclusion that mainly stories of suffering, personal heroism and resistance are reported, which has the effect of ancestors being seen as heroes of resistance or victims of National Socialism. Members of the German "Volksgemeinschaft" use aspects and narratives from Holocaust films and reports from Holocaust victims to tell and reframe their own story of suffering during the end of the war. This leads to narratives, where they experience "deportations in trains", see "piles of corpses" everywhere after the bombings, and have to use strategies of survival, as they are known from the stories of concentration camp inmates. In addition, the study shows how generations of children and grandchildren ignore clear indications for Nazi criminals in the family in order to completely forget them, and show narrative platitudes that are gratefully accepted and cultivated in families. These include: 1. "We didn't know anything about the KZs." 2. "We couldn't do anything; otherwise we would have ended up in the concentration camps." (Which one does not want to have known about.) 3. "We weren´t convinced of Nazism. The Nazis were always the others" 4. "The Germans were victims of the brutal Russians." Jureit and Schneider's book "Felt Victims" ("Gefühlte Opfer: Illusionen der Vergangenheitsbewältigung") deals with the commemorational culture as it was established by the children of the generation of perpetrators, that is, the 68 movement. They assert that this culture is still highly influential today, and that this generation demanded remembrance of the cruelties of Nazi-Germany, but denied the reflection of personal entanglement with this time. The result was the condemnation and supposed dis-identification with the parents' generation, but also one's own flight into a victim-identified culture of remembrance, which portrays the Nazi era from the perspective of the persecuted and deliberately ignores the perspective of the perpetrators. The problem that arises from this development is the denied reflection on the transgenerational continuities with regard to the adoption of ideals, values and ideas of normality which are passed down through the generations. Those ideas and values can´t be overcome so easily, - but by creating a victim-identified way of remembering, it was possible to deny the influence of the parents' generation, as if one could simply slip away from one's socialization into a Jewish-aligned and therefore innocent identity. Jureit and Schneider describe the monument for the murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin as the best-known example for a victim-identified memorial. This monument is supposed to make the visitors feel isolated, disoriented and persecuted and thus lead to empathy with the victims of the Nazi regime. One of the architects describes the intended effect of the memorial on the visitors: "When a Japanese tourist who doesn´t know anything about the Holocaust will visit the monument in 50 years, he will feel something as soon as he enters the monument. Perhaps he will feel what it is like to go into the gas chamber". It must not be explained here that this is not only impossible, but also inappropriately in claiming the victims experience of the Holocaust. I do not deny that after the end of the Third Reich it was important to develop narratives that created empathy with all groups of victims of the Holocaust, the politically persecuted and groups classified as inferior. Empathy was exactly what the German national community had lacked. The paradox of remembering lies in the fact that no one wanted to become a victim of persecution during the Nazi era, but today everyone seems to be willing to accept the victims' perspective or to feel like the victim of this regime. The position of the victim is associated with a nimbus of innocence. One can identify oneself with innocence much more easily than with the blunt indifference of a "Mitläufer", or the willing obedience of the perpetrators and the individuals who were intoxicated with the feeling of superiority. The perpetrator's perspective and the related question of inter-generational continuity avert examination and produce victim-identified memory. Furthermore, in victim-centred remembrance there is also the hope of "redemption" from one's own guilt. There is a certain phantasy that if you remember the victims of the Nazi era with empathy and sincerity, everything will be remedied. This hope was propagated 1985 by the Bundespräsident Weizsäcker in his speech for the 40th anniversary of the end of the war. Weizsäcker rejected the idea of coming to terms with the past, but he still promised a lot to the German population. He said: "We as human beings seek reconciliation. It is precisely for this reason that we must understand that there can be no reconciliation without memory. The experience of millions of deaths is part of the heart of every Jew in the world. This is the case not just because people cannot forget such horror. Memory is part of the Jewish faith. The desire to forget extends exile, and the secret of salvation is memory." How convenient! If you remember the German past sincerely and intensely enough, you can even hope for salvation and reconciliation. This way of remembering does not question the ways that German society benefited from National Socialism and what kind of social and psychological transformations were necessary to create a unified "Volkskörper". Yet the only way to learn from the past is to examine the perspective of the perpetrator to fully understand how National Socialism could have happened. How can the defence mechanisms and deficiencies in German family narratives be explained? During my research for this text and the writing process, I passed through several phases of self-reflection and I have to admit that I didn't like all of them equally. It seemed easy to write and think in an ironical and slightly degrading language about "the insincere Germans". While thinking about which defence strategies they mobilized to escape their inconvenient cognitive dissonances, I had to realize bit by bit: those Germans who constantly talk about their ancestor´s suffering but withhold their crimes during National Socialism -those Germans - I´m a part of them! My father´s parents used to live as ethnic German emigrants in German settlements in the Ukraine, during the time of National Socialism these settlers were regarded as part of the Volksgemeinschaft (national community) by Nazi-Germany. This made me feel uncomfortable. So far, I had only seen my grandparents' story as the story of victims: after the attack by the Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union, they were now considered enemies in the Soviet Union and were therefore deported to Siberia, where they were sentenced to do forced labour. I felt inner turmoil, when thinking about the possibility that they were not only innocent victims, but perhaps also followers of Hitler - and thus also a danger to the Soviet Union. At some point I had to realize that my grandmother's family actually had something to do with "the Nazis". My parents reported that my grandmother's brother had made a "career" in the Wehrmacht and that he had held a high post. After the war, due to his involvement in the war, he could neither return to the Soviet Union nor enter the Federal Republic of Germany and therefore immigrated to Canada. Until this day, I haven't had the courage to ask my parents in a more detailed way about this man, his position in the Wehrmacht and my grandmother's relationship with him. It took me about three weeks to overcome myself and to write these lines. Am I committing iniquity to my dead ancestors by writing this and making it public? Diffuse feelings of guilt accompany this text. Am I afraid of the Sandman who could punish me for my curiosity? I feel that I don't want to know exactly who this brother is and what he did and whether my grandma shared the same political opinions with him. I feel ashamed because of two reasons: shame for my ancestors´ deeds and shame for my conspiratorial not-wanting-to-know. It is difficult to deal with the role of the perpetrators, especially if they belong to ones' family and thus appear as familiar and "normal". The idea that the perpetrators are different, cruel and monstrous is much more comfortable. To think that they don´t have anything in common with oneself or one's family, and that they are guided by incomprehensible motives, gloomy urges, or "abnormal" character traits is a way to keep them far apart from oneself. But oftentimes the evil is not monstrous and "completely different", but rather banal, superficial, convenient and thoughtless. This can also make it clear, how easy and normal it is today to live at the expense of other people, to benefit from their oppression and persecution while being able to sleep well at night. It is as common as it is un-reflected to increase one's self-worth through the depreciation of other groups. It is as "normal" as our grandparents and parents are "normal". It's as "normal" as we are. It is time for this normality to end, 75 years after the war ended. I know that there are people who try to question this "normality", but I fear that they are a minority. For the descendants of all those who belong to the generation of perpetrators, their own family history is evidently painful and difficult to endure, like looking into the glistening light of a floodlight. It is destabilizing both internally and externally because it represents a break with the family and the breaking of ties of loyalty, as well as causing massive uncertainty about the validity of inherited values and thought patterns. Am I now too empathetic with the Germans and their "heavy burden"? To name the perpetrators of one's own family is a break of loyalty with the family; - it scares me and triggers childish fears of punishment and social exclusion. But this creates fundamental self-doubt: who am I if my ancestors were Nazis? And do I manage to live without idealized ancestors whom I may unconsciously rely on as figures of identification? A consistent examination of Nazi history also includes an intensive examination of oneself. A friend of mine once described this as "tracking down the traces of Nazi ideology in one's own heart and the deconstruction of one's socialization that has passed through you". While looking at the insincerity of family memory, the question of unconsciously internalized family morality also arises: have I learned that conspiratorial silence about injustice is good, while naming injustice is bad? I would like to end this text with an open question or a dilemma that I cannot resolve at the moment. It is the question of the meaning of shame, especially the shame of the subsequent generations for the deeds of their ancestors. Is shame essential for dealing with family history? On the one hand, shame can be a blocking and isolating affect that leads to defence and denial of reality in order to protect oneself. Isn't it precisely the moralizing way of speaking about the Nazi era that leads to excessive demands and defence, and to confabulation about resistance and sacrifice in one's own family? But on the other hand: isn't it downright scandalous how little shame the descendants of the perpetrator generation feel and how complacent, and therefore uncritical, they are with themselves, and thereby blindly reproduce the prejudices of their ancestors instead of distancing from them? In addition to shame that isolates and inhibits thinking and feeling, there is also a type of shame that opens me up to other persons and lets me feel my responsibility towards them. It is like a shout from outside that reminds me to integrate the needs and vulnerabilities of others into my thoughts and feelings instead of disregarding them. Those who ward off this kind of shame cannot learn from their mistakes and must continue to deny what has remained unpaid. Even 75 years after the end of the 3rd Reich, many German families, from the generation of great-grandparents to their great-grandchildren, are still unable to recognize the truth: - that they were enthusiastic about Nazi ideology and benefited from it, and that it was possible to deny empathy to certain groups and to become intoxicated with the feeling of belonging to the "Herrenrasse" (master race). After the war, a completely new narrative of democracy and human rights was established, therefore one's own perpetration became a taboo, but remained unprocessed and its ideological orientation therefore unbroken. To name oneself as a descendant of Nazi Ideology is dangerous. It is as dangerous as the curiosity of the main protagonist in Hoffmann's story "The Sandman". For it is precisely the desire to uncover the secrets of his father and the ominous Sandman that destabilize his world. In this respect, disobedience to the social prohibition of recognizing the truth is a momentous decision. It is the decision to put a lot at stake: social ties, cherished certainties about the family and, last but not least, the beloved self-image.
Anastasia Shilova (Russia)
Why are we so committed to restoring the scenery of war in a world dedicated to peace?
Академическое эссе
For essays stimulating public debate on difficult and sensitive topic.
Anastasia Serikova (Russia)
"Objectification of trauma: a "difficult" heritage in a museum".
Julia Machnowska (Poland)
Bystanders' testimonies as a cure for politicization of the question of witnessing Holocaust
Julia Machnowska - graduate of Institute of History, University of Warsaw. Coordinator of program for teachers in Forum for Dialogue, NGO engaging in Polish/Jewish dialogue. Researches the topics of memory, oral history and Jewish history.
There is no doubt that World War II and the Holocaust is currently the most discussed historical period among historians and non-historians, and the subject of heated public debate in Poland. Before the war, Polish territory was home to over 3 million Jews, and was also the soil where a large part of the Holocaust happened. The question of whether non-Jewish Poles should be placed in the category of Raul Hilberg's bystanders or considered as not only passive and indifferent, but also in various ways involved in what was happening, constitutes an important and controversial topic in the Polish public debate. Although other Central and Eastern European countries also face the same questions, it seems that drawing from each other's academic research and supporting other researchers does not occur on a large scale. In the last years, especially since the right-wing Law and Justice party came to power in 2015, the topic of Polish-Jewish relations during WWII has become even more controversial and politicized. The following example illustrates this process well. in 2013 the Institute of National Remembrance (a powerful Polish governmental institution that investigates Nazi and communist crimes but also plays an active role in constructing official state historical policy) organized a conference titled "Being a Witness of the Holocaust", inviting as panelists among others Jan Tomasz Gross, Jan Grabowski and Barbara Engelking, academics who research the question of Polish-Jewish relations during WWII. During the conference heated discussion on the question of "bystanders" outburst, but it was held in boundaries and rules of academic dispute and dialogue. In 2019, a conference in Paris was organized where the work of the same researchers was presented. This time Polish public television, during the most important news program, called it a "Festival of anti-Polish lies" and the vice president of the above mentioned Institute of National Remembrance suggested that the researches were paid by hostile foreign intelligence. Today we face the situation wherein people who prefer to consider Poles as helpers to Jews or passive bystanders are on one side of a barricade, and those who would like to uncover and openly speak about grey or black shades of Polish-Jewish relations during the war are on the other side. The question arises whether it is possible to talk about attitudes of non-Jewish Poles towards their Jewish neighbors with much-needed emotion but without big controversies. The answer may be positive if we consider focusing on eyewitnesses' accounts in order to disarm the problem, at least to some extent. Today the idea that historians should give the voice to those who took part in the events, often to ordinary individuals, is considered stating the obvious. We know that Holocaust history should be studied and told through survivors', rescuers', and other witnesses' relations. Maybe the same approach could also be useful while studying and popularizing knowledge about non-Jewish witnesses of the Holocaust and difficult situations they had to face. The archival documents often lack the human perspective, especially needed in the field of popularization. On the other hand, due to the witnesses' age and the sensitive topic of the interview, memory of the time could be blurry and selective. Nevertheless, we have to be aware that it is the last moment to listen to their account. From the beginning of Operation Barbarossa Einsatzgruppen perpetrated mass shootings of the Jews in the Soviet-ruled territories, but the formal frame of organized extermination was set during Wannsee conference. German high officials agreed on "Final solution to the Jewish question" containing the plan of extermination of Polish Jews in General Government named "Aktion Reinhardt". From March 1942 until November 1943, the formerly established ghettos were liquidated and their inhabitants were sent to death camps. Those who survived "Aktion Reinhardt" were forced to hide and their fate depended mainly on the attitudes and actions of non-Jewish Poles. The extermination could not happen in a vacuum, and complex mechanisms of German administration were needed. The bases for those mechanisms were low-ranking officials such as village chiefs, mayors, policemen or firefighters— in most cases Poles. It would be impossible to transport Jews from distant villages to railroads that led to death camps, if not for requisitioned carts from the villagers. Fast and efficient ghetto liquidations could not happen with only German forces, so Polish policemen or young forced laborers, conscripted into Baudienst units (construction and labor service) were ordered to help. Search for survivors of deportations would be impossible without policemen, firefighters, or nightguard teams who knew the area and their neighbors very well. It all took place in the conditions of war terror: those involved were often threatened with death, both theirs or of hostages. Nevertheless, we cannot forget that some of them took the initiative on their own in search of personal benefits, with a strong conditioning of pre-war antisemitism. Last year I took part in a series of research trips that aimed to reach and record testimonies of non-Jewish witnesses of the Holocaust in Poland. Especially in small towns and villages, people were aware of the fate of their Jewish neighbors but also, in most cases, several members of the community were forced to assist during German-led actions. Those were the people we searched for during research trips, and taking into consideration the way the Holocaust was perpetrated in Poland, in almost every town we should encounter such witnesses. Or rather, we would have encountered them if we had arrived in those villages and towns 10-15 years ago. Those whom we managed to find were children during the war, but some of them, born in the twenties, were teenagers or young adults. Their testimonies are extraordinary— sometimes very honest, and other times with the intention of omitting several parts. They are often accompanied by the relief of telling the story for the first time. In other cases, it is a well-trained and repeated narration. There can be a lot of emotion or a seeming lack of it. Certainly, these are not easy histories that especially because of their complexity should be widely heard, and could influence the shape of the public debate that we are having right now. We met two men who were forced to drive carts to transport Jewish or Roma families to deportation points or to the sites of executions. They took different approaches toward the assignment. One of them advised the family to ran away, while the other did not exchange a word with the family he was transporting. One of the witnesses was caught on his hometown street and forced to participate in ghetto liquidation— he had to search the bodies of those shot, and then transport them to the local cemetery. We interviewed forced laborers conscripted to Baudienst units who took part in ghettos liquidation actions— they had to search houses, round up towns, transport and search bodies, dig and then cover pits for the executions. Some of them worked together with Jewish laborers in the forced work camps. In many towns and villages, the Jews were killed on the spot and local non-Jewish inhabitants were forced to dig and cover the pits. The same happened when the Jews that went into hiding were caught or denounced and executed. We met several witnesses who had to dig a grave, or their fathers, uncles, future husbands were forced to do it and then passed on the story. There are also those who observed the Jews being gathered, deported and executed. During the war, most of the witnesses were curious, vivid children, not aware of the danger, who spent time on streets and, led by their curiosity, observed the actions perpetrated against Jews. Some of the witnesses, because of their young age, were asked by their parents to secretly pass food or water to the Jews during deportations or hiding. In one of the towns, young boys climbed the trees which were bordering the Jewish cemetery and observed the executions. In one location they climbed to the attic of the house near the cemetery. One of the witnesses, at the time a 7-year-old boy, out of curiosity followed a German leading several Jews from the village to a desolated execution site in the forest. He was the only person that could show the exact execution site. Nobody had ever asked him about that day. Surely, there are more witnesses who may be the only ones who know about the sites of smaller executions. Although in public discourse we often lack precise and adequate language to describe human behaviour during the Holocaust, the testimonies, in their whole complexity and with local context in mind, can be instrumental to enriching that discourse. An individual approach requires certain sensitivity and makes unambiguous assessments of war time attitudes hardly possible. The witnesses speak in a clear and simple way, remembering vivid, sometimes crucial, details of traumatic circumstances. One of the women, born in 1933, when recalling observing an execution at the Jewish cemetery, was unconsciously performing body movements, that were part of her witnessing experience in 1942. After more than 70 years, it was especially striking how the traumatic memories can be written even in body language when she was talking to us. This ability to tell difficult stories with simplicity and emotion, not forgetting about the horrifying conditions of the occupation, makes those testimonies extremely valuable. Especially when they are accompanied by the memories of pre-war life, and of Jewish neighbors – a favourite friend from school, a tailor, a shopkeeper. It is not only a chance to add more shades to public discourse, but also to boldly enrich the language and concepts we are so used to while speaking about the Holocaust. It is not only a chance to speak about the concrete actions of individual bystanders or involved non-Jews but also to restore and enrich local history. Sometimes, it may grant a possibility to local communities to speak more openly on the taboo topic which is the attitude of Poles towards the extermination of their former neighbors, or to acknowledge unmarked graves, sometimes located in private fields. There is also huge educational potential in using such testimonies. We are facing the situation in which the last witnesses are soon to be deceased. Their history should be passed on, remembered, critically analysed at local schools with aid of teachers, should be evidence of atrocities and various modes of action during WWII as well as source for teaching about pre-war and war society. Recently "The Economist" published an article about hibakusha, the survivors of the bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki who tell their stories publicly. As their ranks are declining, the city of Hiroshima has recruited volunteers to become denshosha, "legacy successors" who, after special training, take on the job of speaking publicly about hibakusha experience. Although the category of witnessing is completely different in those two cases, and the Japanese idea may be disputable, I believe it is crucial to preserve the testimonies of non-Jewish bystanders of the Holocaust, those ordinary people that could be found in every town – to better understand what World War II was, how the Holocaust happened locally, what was the role of non-Jewish Poles and last but not least to have a chance to look at human behaviour in borderline situation Finally, their voices and recognition of those testimonies may also serve as a critical-thinking tool against big historical narratives that states often try to impose in the politicized reality.
Академическое эссе
Michał KRZYŻANIAK (Poland)
Family history - archivist
For the humanist approach and promotion of the professional work with family archives and documents
Michał Krzyżaniak - student of the Eastern Studies at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. Interested in Soviet period of Russia, history of World War II and Polish People's Republic. Video Essay https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wGASVtOR9WU&feature=youtu.be
Nico Heider (Germany)
Rebuilding the Past: The Reconstruction of Pre-World War II Architecture in Germany
For an original look and references to the subject of memory and oblivion in urban space

Nico Heider is currently completing his master's degree in statistics at the Otto-Friedrich-University Bamberg, before that he graduated from the University of Regensburg with a bachelors degree in Political Science and South-East-European-Studies. During the Second World War, a vast amount of German cities suffered heavy damage. While some almost immediately planned to build historically accurate reconstructions of the destroyed buildings, like the old town of Dresden, the majority rebuilt using a distinct architectural style, later dubbed Post-war Modernism (German: Nachkriegsmoderne). With its clear lines and unembellished exteriors, this style was cheap and easy to build, suitable to hastily provide living and work space for Germany's fast-growing post-war economy. It also represented a clear break from the Neoclassicism preferred by the Nazis. Nowadays these buildings, mostly constructed in the 60s and 70s, often face an uncertain future. Labelled ugly by many and deemed of no cultural significance, a growing number of local politicians, architects, and citizens initiatives are planning to tear many of them down and replace them with buildings either reminiscent of, or clear reconstructions of, pre-World War architecture. Their motivations are manifold and range from simple aesthetic preferences like the perceived bleakness of modernist architecture to expressions of anti-modern ideology and historical revisionism. The most prominent of these projects is located in the city center of Frankfurt am Main. A modernist city administration building from the 70s was destroyed to make space for the reconstruction of several streets of the medieval old town, destroyed during the bombing of the city in 1944. The project titled 'New Old Town' treads the line between accurate reconstruction and Disney-esque medieval fantasy. Only 15 of the 35 buildings are based on destroyed historical buildings while the others are just imaginations of how the buildings might have looked like. Walking around 'New Old Town', visitors and citizens can now immerse, at least for a brief moment, in an alternate history version of Frankfurt, where the Second World War never took place. Brushing aside the horrors of the war and the collateral damage sustained during the liberation of Germany, reconstruction projects do more than just provide a picturesque backdrop for tourist selfies. They actively challenge the German culture of remembrance. A culture that is already under attack by the provocateurs of the right-wing nationalist party Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD). Some of their most prominent party members are downplaying the Second World War as 'bird shit' in a long and successful German history.1 They also call Germany the only country that built a 'monument of shame' into their capital, alluding to the Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin.2 Statements like these are shaking up the antifascist foundation of the German common historical understanding. Demolishing the post-war modernist buildings that serve as a daily reminder of the Second World War, and rebuilding them with architecture representing Germany's – in their eyes – glorious past, is certainly in the interest of nationalists like the AfD. Therefore, it is not by chance that the initiator of the Frankfurt 'New Old Town' project is part of the so-called new-right movement.3 While the debate around reconstruction is currently boiling up, fuelled by prominent projects like the Frankfurt Old Town, the Berlin Palace, and the Garrison Church in Potsdam, the first reconstruction projects started almost immediately after the Second World War. This gives us a chance to compare different approaches to deal with the German past architecturally. For an opposing approach, one must not look further than the German Democratic Republic (GDR). For ideological reasons – and lack of funds – East Germany did not participate in the reconstruction to the same extent as the West. The fate of the Frauenkirche (Church of Our Lady) in Dresden serves as a striking example of the differences between the reconstruction efforts, or lack thereof, employed by the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany. Destroyed during the bombing of Dresden, the remnants of the Frauenkirche remained a largely untouched ruin in the GDR, serving as an anti-war memorial. Like a delayed Wiederaufbau (the period of German reconstruction after WWII), the reconstruction of the church to its original shape began shortly after the German reunification. It becomes quite clear that the underlying concept of legitimizing a state by recreating a piece of its past was less essential to the GDR, where the ideological focus was on the utopia of the communist future and the advancements of the party towards achieving it. This is not a perfect example – churches had a hard time in the GDR in general and the reconstruction was mostly financed by donations – but it shows that there are other ways to treat Germany's architectural past than just reconstruction. Another example is the Reichstag. A modernist glass dome was added to the historic German parliament, heavily damaged by fire 1933 and by the Second World War. The glass dome adds a symbolic architectural element and manages to combine a building steeped in German history with an alteration representing contemporary democracy. These examples show that even if destroyed buildings are culturally very important, efforts of photo-realistic reconstruction are not the only way to approach the preservation of their significance. To view reconstruction projects simply as right-wing efforts to rewrite history would be short-sighted and oversimplify the many nuanced reasons why they are popular. More so, they are a symptom of a longing for simpler times in an increasingly complicated world, an appeal they share with many right-wing groups. Every reconstruction project should be examined very carefully; if not they might inadvertently change the German culture of remembrance and play into the hands of historical revisionists. Photo https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8d/Dom-Roemer-Projekt-Huehnermarkt-06-2018-Ffm-Altstadt-10008-9.jpg
Цель программы
Выездная образовательная программа MemoAct нацелена на укрепление международного сотрудничества в области мемориальной культуры и гражданской солидарности. Участниц и участников программы ждут мастер-классы и проектные сессии, знакомство с представителями активистских мемориальных инциатив и историко-культурных институций Варшавы и Гданьска.